

THE BUDDHIST



JULY/AUGUST, 1958

Vol. XXIX

Nos. 3 & 4



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THE BUDDHIST

(Organ of the Colombo Young Men's Buddhist Association)

“*Sīla Paññānato Jayam*”



FOUNDED 1888

Editors : ANANDA GURUGE, B.A., Ph.D.
W. P. DALUWATTE.

Vol. XXIX]

REGISTERED AS A
NEWSPAPER IN CEYLON

JULY/AUGUST, 1958

PUBLISHED BY THE
COLOMBO Y. M. B. A.

[Nos. 3 & 4

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PIRIVENA UNIVERSITIES

In presenting the Bill, the Honourable Dahanayake says,

“The Vidyodaya Pirivena, Maligakanda and the Vidyalan-kara Pirivena, Kelaniya, are the two premier educational institutions in Ceylon. They are considered to be of University Status, and they enjoy an international reputation as seats of advanced oriental learning.

nomous and in no way inferior to the University already in existence. This legal provision, added to over a century of experience as training Centres in Oriental Studies, will enable the two Universities to attain and maintain a high academic standard.

While wishing the two Universities all the best in their service to the cause of Buddhist and Oriental Studies, we venture to place before them a humble suggestion for their consideration. It is our fervant hope that these institutions will grow primarily as Buddhist seats of learning and would revive the ancient traditions of such celebrated Buddhist Universities as Nalanda and Vikramasila. In Ceylon, they have the example of the Mahavihara to follow. The fame of the Mahavihara spread throughout the Buddhist World and pilgrims like Fa Hien came all the way from China to learn the Dhamma and to copy the literary treasures it protected while Buddhaghosa was sent by his teacher to make available in the *lingua franca* of the time the Commentaries which were indispensable for the study of Buddhism. While these Universities should serve the modern requirements of the Nation by training students for various walks of life, they should primarily concern themselves with the advancement of Buddhist and Oriental Studies. As such, they have the capacity to be the most celebrated seats of Buddhist and Oriental Studies in the World.

We wish the two Universities long years of service to our Island.

NOTE

WE regret to note that “Racaka” in his article on the history of the Y.M.B.A. in the Vesak Annual failed to mention the name of Mr. P. P. Siriwardene who had been the Editor of the “Buddhist” for five years.

We gratefully record that Mr. Siriwardene was responsible for the revival of this publication when he was the Organizing Secretary of the Y.M.B.A.

We apologize to him for the omission.—Editors.

However they lack the legal status of Universities. The present Bill intends to remedy this defect. It will also assist in meeting the need for Sinhalese qualified persons in accordance with the language policy of the Government.

The Bill is based on the Ceylon University Ordinance, No. 20 of 1942, with suitable modifications.”

It is, indeed, gratifying to note that the two Universities will be auto-

THE introduction in the House of Representatives of the Bill granting University Status to the Vidyodaya Pirivena of Maligakanda and the Vidyalan-kara Pirivena of Peliyagoda is a significant landmark in the history of Buddhist and Oriental Education in Ceylon. Not only the Buddhist Public but also the lovers of Oriental Literature and Culture would whole-heartedly congratulate the Honourable W. Dahanayake, the Minister of Education, whose indefatigable labours have brought the fulfilment of one of their cherished hopes within sight. The benefits which our country will derive as a result of the new status given to these two institutions will, no doubt, be immense. They will be the premier organizations which will tackle one of the Island's most important and equally difficult problems of training personnel who are able, in accordance with the educational and administrative policies, to work in Sinhalese. They will, also, contribute towards the advancement of Buddhist Studies both within and without the Island.

CHARITY OR DANA IN BUDDHISM

By SIRI PERERA

CHARITY or Dana is the act of giving which is practised by all civilised people. Every act of giving is not charity. For instance, the giving of money on interest or without interest as a loan to be returned is not charity. Nor is it charity to donate money or material for the construction of hospitals, schools and other social institutions with the object of obtaining honours, praise, or recognition by the State or the people. Such giving is primarily intended to benefit the giver and not the recipient.

Thus it will be seen that the act of giving in order to constitute charity should be solely for the benefit or well-being of the recipient. In other words, the motive of the donor is paramount. In Buddhism, charity or Dana is not complete unless it is motivated by the appropriate mental condition. This necessarily follows from the fact that the Buddha has taught that the mind is all important as is laid down in the first stanza in the Dhamma Pada :

*Mano Pubban gama Dhamma
Mano Settha Mano Maya.*

Mind precedes all conditions.

Mind is supreme and mental concomitants are mind-made.

Now, charity or Dana is the first of the ten Paramis or Virtues which must be practised by all seekers after Enlightenment.

It is also one of the seven Ariya Dhanas or Riches that belong to Noble Beings. The Buddha has also taught that it is one of the Four Sangrahas or methods of treating fellow-beings. These facts clearly bring out the importance of the virtue of charity in Buddhism. Indeed, when a seeker after the Supreme Enlightenment of a Buddha, who is known to all Buddhists as a Bodhisatva, like the Hermit Sumedha, receives a Pronouncement (Vivarana) from a Buddha that he is destined to become a Buddha at sometime in the distant future, such Bodhisatva reflects on the virtues necessary for such a Supreme Attainment and begins with the practice of Dana of Charity. This is so because Dana is a firm foundation for all the other virtues. A person who has not the virtue of charity in him is not capable of practising

the other virtues: A little reflection will show how true this is. For all sinful acts are those that do harm to other sentient beings. It has been shown earlier that the basis of all true charity is the desire to promote the well-being of the recipients of that charity. Hence, a person who practises such giving cannot do any act which will inflict pain or suffering on other beings and will, therefore, be pre-disposed to practise such other virtues as Sila or Morality and Maitriya or Loving Kindness.

Therefore, one can say that the extent of one's charity is the extent of one's other virtues. In other words, charity can be regarded as a yard-stick for measuring other virtues. To illustrate the point, take the case of a person whose sense of charity is developed only to the extent of being able to give away a rupee when he is able to give away more. If such a person were to find himself in a situation in which he can gain a rupee or has to lose a rupee, he will not take the life of a fellow-being in order to gain that rupee or prevent the loss of that rupee as the case may be. But, supposing the amount involved in such a situation were to be Rs. 100 then he might kill. The same line of reasoning will apply to other sins like thieving, lying, and slandering.

Now, if the person who practises charity does so, as he should, solely with the motive of promoting the well-being and happiness of the recipients, then he is free from attachment to the subject of his giving. Therefore such giving is free from Lobha or craving which is one of the three roots of sin.

Dana falls into three categories, i.e.: (1) the giving of material things such as food, clothing, houses and medicines; (2) the giving of freedom of fear; and (3) the giving of the Dhamma or Truth.

To take the last category first. In Buddhism to give or propagate the Dhamma is the highest and noblest gift, "Sabba Danan Dhamma Danan Jinati." To any person who knows that the aim of Buddhism is to teach the Way to Nibbana, that is the cessation of suffering, it should be obvious why the giving of the Dhamma should

be the highest and most meritorious. There is no better way to help a person to attain Nibbana than to show to that person the road to Nibbana. Hence the greatest gift such a person can receive is the gift of the Dhamma.

It would seem that the second kind of charity, the giving of freedom from fear, is in importance second only to the gift of the Dhamma. A very ordinary instance of the giving of freedom from fear is to rescue an animal that is being led for slaughter or obtain a reprieve for a person under sentence of death. But there is another kind of freedom from fear which is primarily Sila or Morality but which is, nevertheless, also charity. This is the observance of the Five Precepts. Take for instance, the First Precept of refraining from killing. Now a person who observes this precept very strictly not only does not take or participate in taking the life of a fellow-being in any circumstances but also, by such observance, gives to all living beings a freedom from fear or death or violence at that person's hands. All the complications and complexities of life arise from this feeling of fear of one another. This fear may be fear of death, violence, loss of possessions, lying, slandering, abuse, anger and hatred. Thus the individual or the nation possessed material goods live in constant fear of theft, robbery, violence, murder and even war. If individuals and nations were to practise Sila or Morality then society can live free from such fear and therefore in happiness.

One of the best ways known to Buddhism in which a person can give to other living beings freedom from fear is to practise Maitriya or loving kindness to all living beings. It is needless to say that a person who truly practises this attitude of friendship and loving kindness towards all living beings will not do any harm or injury, mental or physical, to any living being. Thus the practice of Maitriya transcends all other acts of giving freedom from fear implicit in the observance of the Five Precepts.

It seems that it was for this reason that the Buddha declared in the Velama Sutta recorded in the Angut-

tara Nikaya, Navaka Nipataya, as follows :—

More meritorious, oh ! Bhikkhus, than giving to worldlings for seven years and seven months a Dana consisting of the most expensive goods and clothing and the most sumptuous food is the Dana that is given to a Sota Panna or Stream-Enterer; more meritorious than giving to hundred such Stream-Enterers is a Dana given to a Sakradagami or one who has attained the second stage of Arahantship; more meritorious than giving to hundred such is the Dana given to one

Anagami or Non-Returner; More meritorious than giving to hundred such is the Dana given to an Arahant; more meritorious than giving to a hundred such is the Dana given to one Pachheka or Silent Buddha; more meritorious than giving to hundred such is the Dana given to a Supreme Buddha; more meritorious than giving to a Buddha is the Dana given to a Buddha who is associated with the Noble Sangha; more meritorious than this is to build a Vihara dedicated to the Sangha who hail from the four corners of the zodiac; even better than this is to take refuge

in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha; more meritorious even than this is to observe the Five Precepts; better than all these meritorious and virtuous acts is to practise Maitri, if only for the time taken to hold to one's nostril some fragrant object.

Thus the practice of Maitriya is better than the best forms of charity or Dana in Buddhism. For, a person who practises Maitriya must, of necessity, practise Dana. Such a person knows no barriers of caste, class, creed, or race. He is a citizen of the world.

May all beings be happy and well.

THE APPEAL OF BUDDHISM

In the "Buddhist Forum" of Radio Ceylon on June 1st, 1958, four self-converted Buddhists were asked to speak on the subject of "What appealed to me most in Buddhism." The following is the reply given by the

ANAGARIKA SUGATANANDA (FRANCIS STORY)

IT was many years ago when I became a Buddhist and I was quite young, between 14 and 16, but I remember that it was first of all the two facts of rebirth and Kamma which convinced me of the truth of the Dhamma. I say "facts" because even among many non-Buddhists rebirth is now well on the way to being a proven truth, and once it is accepted the reality of Kamma must be accepted with it.

In the first place, these two doctrines explain everything in life which is otherwise inexplicable. They explain the seeming injustices with which life abounds, and which no earthly power can remedy. They explain, too, the apparent futility and lack of a satisfactory pattern in the individual human life which, taken as one life out of a measureless eternity is obviously quite pointless, full of unresolved problems and incomplete designs. Take, for instance, a recent and much-publicised example of what appears to be a cruel freak of chance—the tragically brief life of a child, Red Skelton's son, whom neither human science nor divine mercy could save. There are, and always have been, countless millions of such cases, besides the untold numbers of blind, deaf and dumb, deformed, mentally deficient and diseased human beings whose pitiful condition is not due to any fault of

theirs in this present life, nor to any remediable defect in the organisation of human society.

Materialists may say what they will, but we now know enough of the limitations of science to realise that it will never be able entirely to abolish these evils. At the same time we can no longer derive comfort from religions that science has discredited. While we know that material progress will never succeed in abolishing suffering, it is equally futile to suppose that some special compensation for unmerited misfortune awaits the victims in a future life irrespective of any moral issues that are involved.

The sense of justice, which was very strong in me, demanded a reason for these things and an intelligible purpose behind them. I could not accept the theory that there is a "divine justice" which is different from human concepts of justice, for both the word and the idea can only mean what we take them to mean by human standards. If conditions are not just in the human sense they are not just at all: there cannot be two different meanings to the word. The "justice of God" is an invention of theologians, the last refuge of unreason.

But right at the beginning Buddhism gave me the justice and the purpose which I had been

seeking. I found them both in the doctrine of Kamma and rebirth. Through them I was at last able to understand the otherwise senseless agglomeration of misery, futility and blind, insensate cruelty which forms most of the picture human life presents to a thinking person.

Those who know something of the subject may say, Yes, but Buddhism is not alone in teaching Kamma and rebirth; Hinduism has it also. That is true; but Buddhism is alone in presenting rebirth as a scientific principle. When I say "scientific" I mean that it is a principle which is in accordance with other universal laws which can be understood scientifically and even investigated by scientific methods. The principle of change and serial continuity is one that runs throughout nature; all scientific principles are based on it. In Buddhism it is the principle of "Anatta" which lifts the concept of rebirth from the level of primitive animism to one on which it becomes acceptable to the scientifically-trained mind. "Anatta" means "non-soul," "non-ego" and "non-self"; it is the denial of any abiding or constant and unchanging element in the life-process. Buddhism does not point to a "soul" that transmigrates; it points to a continuum of cause and effect that is exactly analogous to the processes of physics. The personality of one life is the

result of the actions of the preceding current of existences, in precisely the same way that any physical phenomenon at any given moment is the end-result of an infinite series of events of the same order that have led up to it.

When I came to understand this thoroughly, which I did by pondering the profound doctrine of *Paticca-samuppada* (Dependent Origination), I realised that the Buddha Dhamma is a complete revelation of a dynamic cosmic order. Complete scientifically because it accounts not only for human life but for the life of all sentient beings from lowest to highest; and complete morally because it includes all these forms of life in the one moral order. Nothing is left out; nothing unaccounted for in this all-embracing system. If we should find sentient beings on other planets in the remotest of the galactic systems, we should find them subject to the same laws of being as ourselves. They might be physically quite different from any form of life on this earth, their bodies composed of different chemical combinations, and they might be far superior to ourselves or far below us, yet still they must consist of the same Five *Khandha* aggregates, because these are the basic elements of all sentient existence. They must also come into being as the result of past *Kamma*, and pass away again just as we do. *Anicca*, *Dukkha* and *Anatta* are universal principles; and this being so, the Four Noble Truths must also be valid wherever life exists. There is no need for a special creation or a special plan of salvation for the inhabitants of this planet or any other. Buddhism teaches a cosmic law that obtains everywhere; hence the same moral law of spiritual evolution must prevail everywhere. Cosmic law and moral order in Buddhism are related to one another as they are not in any other religious system.

Another fact which struck me forcibly right at the beginning is that Buddhism does not condemn anybody to eternal hell just because he happens not to be a Buddhist. If a being goes to the regions of torment after death it is because his bad deeds have sent him there, not because he happens to believe in the wrong set of dogmas. The idea that anyone should be eternally damned simply because he does not go to a certain church and subscribe to its particular creed is repugnant to every right-thinking person. Moral retribution is a necessity, but this vicious doctrine of damnation for not

believing in a certain god and the particular myths surrounding him has nothing whatever to do with ethical principles. It is itself supremely immoral. It has probably been the cause of more harm in the world than any other single factor in history.

Furthermore, Buddhism does not postulate eternal punishment for temporal sins; that is, for misdeeds committed within the limiting framework of time. The Dhamma teaches that whatever suffering a man may bring upon himself is commensurate with the gravity of the evil action—neither more nor less. He may suffer through several lives because of some very heavy *Akusala Kamma* (evil action), but sometime that suffering must come to an end when the evil that has been generated has spent itself. The atrocious idea that a being may be made to suffer throughout eternity for the sins committed in one short lifetime does not exist in Buddhism. Neither does the equally unjust doctrine that he may wash out all his sins by formal acts of contribution or by faith in some one particular deity out of all the gods man has invented.

In Buddhism, also, there is no personal judge who condemns, but only the working of an impersonal law that is like the law of gravitation. And this point is supremely important, because any judge in the act of judging would have to outrage either justice or mercy. He could not satisfy the demands of both at the same time. If he were inexorably just he could not be called merciful: if he were merciful to sinners he could not be absolutely just. The two qualities are utterly incompatible. Buddhism shows that the natural law is just. It is for man to be merciful, and by the cultivation of *Metta*, *Karuna*, *Medita* and *Upekkha* to make himself divine.

Lastly, the truth that rebirth and suffering are brought about by Ignorance and Craving conjointly is a conclusion that is fully supported by all we know concerning the life-urge as it works through human and animal psychology and in the processes of biological evolution. It supplies the missing factor which science needs to complete its picture of the evolution of living organisms. The motivating force behind the struggle for existence, for survival and development, is just this force of Craving which the Buddha found to be at the root of *Samsaric* rebirth. Because it is conjoined with Ignorance it is a blind, groping force, yet it is this force which has been

responsible for the development of complex organisms from simple beginnings. It is also the cause of the incessant round of rebirths in which beings alternately rise and fall in the scale of spiritual evolution.

Realising the nature of this two-fold bondage of Ignorance and Craving we are fully justified in the rational faith that, as the Supreme Buddha taught, our ultimate release, the attainment of the eternal, unchanging state of *Nibbana*, is something that we can reach, by eliminating all the factors of rebirth that are rooted in these two fundamental defects. *Nibbana*, which the Buddha described as *Asankhata*, the Unconditioned, *Ajara*, the Ageless, *Dhuva*, the Permanent and *Amata*, the Deathless, is the Reality that lies outside the realm of the conditioned and illusory *Samsara*, and it may be reached only by extinguishing the fires of *Lobha*, *Dosa* and *Moha*.

So we see that *Saddha*, or faith, in Buddhism is firmly based on reason and experience. Ignorance is blind, but Buddhist faith has its eyes wide open and fixed upon reality. The Dhamma is called "*Ehi passiko*"—that which invites all to come and see for themselves. The Buddha was the only religious teacher who invited reasoned, critical analysis of His Doctrine. The proof of its truth—and hence the conclusive proof of the Buddha's Enlightenment as well—is to be found in the Doctrine itself. Like any scientific discovery it can be tested empirically. Everyone can test and verify it for himself, both by reason and by direct insight. The Buddhist is given a charter of intellectual liberty.

These are just a few of the features which appealed to me when I first started studying Buddhism in my quest for truth. There were many others which followed later; they came in due course as my own understanding and practice of the Dhamma made them manifest to me. As one investigates the Dhamma new vistas are constantly opening up before one's vision; new aspects of the truth are continually unfolding and fresh beauties are being disclosed. When so much of moral beauty can be discerned by merely intellectual appreciation of the Dhamma, I leave it to you who are listening to imagine for yourselves the revelations that come with the practice of *Vipassana* or direct insight. There can be nothing in the entire range of human experience with which it may be compared.

BUDDHISM AND ITS RELATION TO RELIGION AND SCIENCE

By
R. G. de S. WETTIMUNY

CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CONCEPT

I AWAKEN to things through what is called the *concept, pannatti*, I have of things, through that distinct mind-consciousness of things. The concept is that which relates me to the object, and all my actions with regard to that object are fashioned by the concept I have of it. What incites me to action is the concept. In dependence on the concept I judge things; or the concept sits in judgment over things. "This is moral, that is immoral"; "this is good, that is bad"; "this is beautiful, that is ugly"; "this is worthy, that is unworthy"; "this is to be proud of, that is to be ashamed of"; "this I must lay hold of, that I must get rid of";—all these are the various judgments which the concept makes over things.

Now all these judgments are justifiable to the truth-seeker only in as far as the concept is justifiable in the court of truth, in the court of actuality. That is, only in as far as the concept is in harmony with truth. And unless this is known the concept has only a provisional value—provisional, pending further judgment, further investigation.

Knowledge as is generally understood is no more than an accumulation of concepts. In this long drawn-out process of conceptual thinking, we find logic, reason, living experience, and imagination playing different parts. For ever swings the concept between the limits of truth and untruth. Resulting therefrom, range my actions between the one limit that is in entire harmony with truth and the other limit that is in entire contradiction with truth. The outcome of which actions is that on the one extreme there is tranquility and peace, and on the other there is restlessness and worry.

But where lies the proof of truth?

The only proof that I can have of truth is through my own living experience. Yet all living experience may not be in accordance with truth. To have a wrong notion of a thing, such as to take for water the sunshine on the sand, is also a living experience. One can make out a long list of the contradictions that result from the dogmatic assumptions current in the world. I know that I am experiencing truth only if I find no contradiction in it. Where one works out from a right basis,

there one subsequently finds no cause whatever to doubt the validity of that basis. But where a fictitious or incorrect basis is adopted, and from that basis things are worked out, there one finds that in the subsequent working out the basis is deprived of the possibility of existence, or it is found to abjure its own title to exist. In such a case, one has to merely believe in that basis or reject it entire. A truth-seeker has to follow the latter course.

Where one starts off rightly there one does not meet with contradiction. No one has to tell me that I am in harmony with truth. It forms its own proof. As William James says: "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as."

Now, wisdom, or right insight, means just this: To know rightly the laws of conditionality, or in commoner language, to know the right relation between causes and effects. In stricter terms, it is to comprehend actuality, to comprehend things as they really are. All the great minds of the world have been after this, whether such pursuits be termed sciences or philosophies or anything else. And that quite rightly too; for there is naught else that is worthy of being known and need be known.

With this one is faced with actuality, with the happenings of the universe, which includes oneself too, and also the means whereby one begins to fall into relation with actuality—the concept.

It does not then take one much to realize that the concept which is the means that is left to one to probe into actuality becomes the thing of first importance. Not to comprehend and grasp what the concept is before all else would be like trying to survey a piece of land with hills and dales, fences and ditches, without first knowing all about the instrument with which the survey is to be made. There is a world. But that mere fact does not permit me to ascribe to the world a fortui-

tous origin or a creator-God. Before I can try to fathom the happenings of the universe I should know all about the instrument with which I am trying to fathom these happenings; that is, I should know all about myself first. Else, I shall also be like one of those blind men who went to see the elephant, as is narrated in the Buddhist stories. Each of them made a different statement on the elephant by feeling some part of its body; and no two of them agreeing, they fell upon one another bringing disaster upon themselves.

“In such points Brahmins and recluses stick
Wrangling on them, they violently discuss—
Poor folk! they see but one side of the shield!”

That this same falling upon one another with violence befell certain religious systems, history recounts. Dogmas carry within their loins the seeds of their own disruption; for dogmas are the outcome of a lack of right understanding. And it has been only too well proved to us that if the adherents of such dogma do not keep themselves in severe restraint, they might well run on the tracks of fanaticism.

Now, the happenings of the universe present themselves to the thinker in the form of what is referred to as cause and effect, in the form of an infinite series where every cause which brings about an effect has in turn been the effect of a previous cause. One is confronted with an infinite causal series with which is tied up the infinity of time and the infinity of space. Action always implies a particular portion of space and a particular period of time in union.

Bare conceptual thinking when it tries to comprehend causality, time and space, upbrings insoluble dilemmas. Thought can revolt at either of the propositions that the world is finite or is infinite. Whether one travels at the speed of light or otherwise, the question still comes: What beyond? In whatever manner space is conceived, curved or otherwise, the same question still remains to be answered. One is driven to conceive something beyond, and without end; though yet, at the same time an infinite world in space is an inconceivability. The same applies to time. To conceive an eternity is impossible; though one cannot at the same time conceive any point in the past or future without having to answer the questions: What before? What after? Time, conceptually treated, only pushes one farther and farther into the infinitude, into the infinite past and the infinite future. The present becomes no more than the turning point where the future becomes the past,—a turning point which ever and again recedes with every attempt to snatch it. And with causality an uncaused first cause is an inconceivability. A beginning to this causality can never be reached, for just like the limits of space and the limits of time “it unceasingly recedes *in infinito*.”

From these alleys Kant clears himself by treating time and space as modes of perception, by throwing time and space from the objective (as Science treats them) into the subjective. To him, they were “pure intuitions” (*anschauung*). Thus Kant escaped from the labyrinth of concepts regarding time, space and causality; but only very temporarily. Likewise Hume also did some “borrowing” from actuality when he criticized the logical concepts of cause and effect and of Self. In all these clever minds one discerns a groping in the dark, feeling but not seeing. To all of them the impact of the pure Buddha-word is wanting to kindle the spark that will begin to throw the light to see.

I shall have to come back to this subject of causality, time and space, later, and make an attempt to indicate their actual significance. At this stage I must be content by saying that for the bare conceptual thinker time and space form two great obstacles that lie in the way of his right understanding, and serves to only loose him in infinity if not in a jungle of views.

How now does the concept react to all this? How does it react when confronted with causality?

Conceptual thought reacts in one or other of two fundamental modes. That is it reacts with an *inaccessibility* on the one hand, and with an *accessibility* on the other hand. With an *imperceptibility*, and with a *perceptibility*; with an *incomprehensibility*, and with a *comprehensibility*; with an *indemonstrability*, and with a *demonstrability*. The former reaction is called Religion; the latter reaction is called Science.

Firstly, there is an irrational understanding of the problem, a mere believing in things, faith, as of Religion. And secondly, there is a rational understanding, as of Science. Or, an *a priori* assumption on the one hand, and an *a posteriori* deduction on the other.

Religion says: There is something not accessible, not perceptible, not demonstrable, lying at the root of all things, as the first cause of all things, as the beginning of all things. Science says. Such an assumption is to be rejected; an inaccessibility cannot be accepted; anything should be accessible, perceptible, and demonstrable through something else. Thus Religion deals essentially with the *beyond reach*; Science deals with the *within reach*.

To a series which does not permit the conceivability of a beginning Religion attempts to conceive a beginning, to conceive something that is only “cause”. But such a thing the living experience of actuality does not permit of comprehension, and so becomes an unthinkable, an incomprehensibility. And just as much as the statement, “God created the world”, merely invites the question, “Who created God?”, the assertion of a “first cause” merely invites the question,

"How come this first cause?" A first cause, whether it be called a *primum mobile immotum*, or *Actus Purus*, or something else, is as impossible to comprehend as a beginning to time or a limit to space. Such things, in truth, exist only in words, or in the works of the type of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. It is hardly of value any more than the *substans* or the God of Spinoza, or the thing-in-itself of Kant and Schopenhauer. At the most they are no more than mere labels given to certain abstract concepts. And when the erudite scholars of our day write things such as: "This concrete universe of modes and things is to God as a bridge is to its design, its structure, and the laws of mathematics and mechanics according to which it is built; these are the sustaining basis, the underlying condition, the substance of the bridge; without them it would fall", it only shows how far eruditeness and love of metaphysical profundities have taken them from a right comprehension of actuality. Such statements are the products of minds which have been overheated with phantasies such as the Theory of Universals, a theory which some of the ancient Indian ascetics seem to have had even before their Western counterpart Plato, and from which theory there developed two other equally speculative theories called *monism* and *monadism*, advocated in turn by Spinoza and Leibniz. Equally disgusting is it to read statements of the kind: "The symbol is always a sensuous or material object, and the reality is always something non-sensuous." This same writer talks of "pure thought" as against "sensuous-thought". The trouble with all these definitions and attempts to clearly demarcate things is that their authors take a sudden and mighty leap out of the whole business when they have woven round themselves an inextricable knot, leaving the helpless reader to discover by himself just how these worthies did the vanishing trick with all their "pure" and "non-pure" thoughts. They further display a greater "superstitious devotion" to words than does Aristotle. The design of a bridge has no existence at all except as a concept in the minds of those who designed the bridge. Even so is the case here with God—a concept in the minds of those who preach such logical sophistry. Things are happening, and they happen in a certain fashion. But that does not mean that 'fashion', or "design", or call it by whatever name one wishes to, exists behind all things physically or metaphysically. I am reminded of that statement of J. S. Mill which Ogden and Richards quote in their admirable work, *The Meaning of Meaning*: "The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever receives a name must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own; and if no entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse and mysterious, too high to be an object of sense." What the difficulty with all this eruditeness is we shall presently see.

Religion thus postulates something without supplying the conditions necessary for such a thing to exist. If Religion attempts to give the conditions that keep this something in existence, then this something no longer remains the beginning! And if Religion is to exist it must maintain this non-conditioned-ness from which it starts building its edifice of concepts, demanding at the same time unquestioned belief therein. What precisely is this beginning? We have to agree with Schopenhauer that at the most it is the "precious rarity" in which the theologians seek refuge. Something which "under threat of everlasting punishment we dare not question as to whence and why it is." Logically, perhaps, Religion is justified. For it does no more than falling for the "threats and the allurements" of the causal series which brings forth to the bare conceptual thinker the statement: *Surely there must be a beginning!* This statement very threateningly demands an answer; and Religion cannot resist the demand. It logically finds an answer. And the strange thing about this logical mode of thought is that it tries to prove the validity of its answer only after first believing in it. For those who believe, no proof is required. They first imagine and then go looking for reasons to support that imagination, a procedure which, incidentally, the Buddha warned men against adopting. If a man says that God created the world, he might as well quite frankly say without deceiving himself: I do not know how the world has come into existence. If he reflects further he would have to admit that he does not really know what the "world" is that he is speaking of. God is not something that man has honestly found in his search. It is something that man has first conceptually assumed, and then is a going searching for. The concept of a first cause is, to use a common phrase, as old as the hills, even though various peoples have coined various names for it and have bestowed varying attributes to it. Nowhere were there so many permutations and combinations of such attributes of a first cause and a Self as in India at the time the Buddha appeared. Theological explanations with regard to these concepts are elementary in comparison to those of the Indian ascetics living in that era. In this flow of conceptual thought the concept is sitting in judgment over the concept; and a theologian who starts to disprove the existence of God might well end up by proving the existence of God!

Whatever beginning one appoints to the causal series, one is bound to meet with contradiction, with disappointment. But truth is that which works with no contradiction either at the beginning, middle, or end; and of course, no truth has anything to fear from other truths. When things believed in contradict living experience, there faith is demanded. Such beliefs are the direct outcome of Ignorance. And Religion demands belief entirely because in its working out it deprives itself of the possibility of expounding truth.

There is Ignorance without a doubt; and that is precisely why faith exists—because of the absence of a right understanding of things. In the believer there goes on mental conflict and agitation. Clever minds which have adhered to monotheistic faith seem to have been in a most peculiar plight. In their uncontrolled brilliance they shatter the basis of their faiths; but no sooner than they realize what they are doing they take a leap out of their brilliance, and then, soaring into the heights of emotion, they begin to assert the glories of their faith. Pascal and Rousseau afford two good examples.

Much is heard of experiencing and realizing God. In the ancient Katha Upanishads, in the story of the Nachiketas, appear the highest Vedanta teachings regarding the "realization of Brahman". But all these "realizations" and "experiences" of an Absolute that stands opposed to actuality cannot be called experience of truth; nor can they be called the attainment of highest wisdom. To be sure, such realizations and experiences have their own consequences, though they need not be labelled "realizing God" or "realizing Brahman".

In the last analysis, Religion always falls back on the incomprehensible, and deals with the incomprehensible; and *must remain incomprehensible if it is to exist!* This incomprehensibility is the very essence of religious faith. And it has been the practice of those who deal in such incomprehensibilities to cloth them in empty phraseology for the most part, such as for instance Aquinas does when he describes God in the words: "The highest knowledge we can have of Him is the conviction that He is beyond anything we can think of Him." (*De Veritate*, ii, 9). How one can assert the existence of something, nay, even speak of something that is "beyond anything we can think of" that same thing, is something we can leave to theologians to find out between themselves. These are all sophisms, formulated to cover up incomprehensibilities not accessible to living experience. These are all *veritates oeternae* that are *a priori*, and as such ever and again remain to be judged. And in spite of all these *veritates oeternae*, in spite of all these sophisms, the misery of the world continues to fall back on God "who made everything and everything that is in everything and also knew how everything would go." Ecclesiastics, who in the course of their profession find it expedient to come down from the incomprehensibilities of Aquinas to earthy definitions, and so preach that God is love or that God is justice or some such thing, only find themselves hitting their heads against that "rock" of Epicurus: "Either God wished to prevent evil and could not do so; or he was able to do so and did not wish."

When incomprehensibilities form the foundations of thought, there faith is demanded. Faith and belief

come in only where things are founded on contradictory premises. That statement of Augustine, "What is faith unless it is to believe what you cannot see," only indicates how in the final analysis theology must fall back on faith, on mere belief. But Augustine was putting it mildly that way. If this statement were to define faith more accurately, it would run thus: What is faith unless it is to believe what your living experience and insight does not permit of belief? And all those proofs of the existence of God, whether they be called *ontological* or *cosmological* or *physicotheological* or any other—*logical*, are nothing but a "subtle playing with concepts" which only leads the truth-seeker into writhings. In the cosmological proof, for instance, we find that Religion starts looking for an adequate cause for all there is, and then as if by some juggler's trick suddenly finds something for the existence of which we are told of no cause. This something is made a "cause-in-itself", and from this "cause-in-itself" alone Religion proclaims everything else to have been caused. Thus Religion postulates into existence something which blows asunder the only thing from which it derives its reasoning power, and from the basis of which it started out—the causal series. It makes use of the causal series only as far as this same series can testify to its dogmas, and then kills it, "like the bees kill the drones after they have served their end." The physico-theological proof, on the other hand, arbitrarily assumes that that which is first and original and that from which everything else has preceded to be an *intelligence* or that everything has been brought about in the world by an *intellect*. But sad to say, of all these proofs, the proof which has however effected the common man and has produced believers is that proof which caters to his personal gain in the face of his unenlightened condition—a proof which has been termed *keraunological*.

The essential nature of anything that is contrary to and stands opposed to living experience is that when from it things are followed up, the result is that that thing is deprived of its existence. To yet cling to such a first premise means to believe in it for some advantage whatever that be. Thus Religion must, come what may, demand belief. "Believe ye, or else ye be—!" That is the nerve that runs through Religion if Religion is to live. It is the heart of all religious faith, which pumps out and sends forth all those dictums of morality however noble they be. That, "to the believer, God can become nothing more than a "certain hope" is certainly true. As variegated as people's emotions are, are their concepts of God. Pantheism in its highest form, as found in the Indian Vedantas, tries to overcome the absurdities and the inconsistencies that arise in its wake, by using the negative. "God is not this", "God is not that", "God is not any of those things". Such statements are of course devoid of any useful content.

So much then for the prime reaction of Religion to actuality. How now does the other mode of comprehension, Science, react to it?

As against the irrational reaction of Religion, Science reacts rationally to causality. The "cause-in-itself" which Religion starts from, that Science rejects, and extracts from causality whatever it can through a process of deduction.

Science seeks to read the happenings of the universe. With the help of such readings, it attempts to compute and thereby predict things in advance. The happenings that Science reads do not pertain to things themselves, but to the relations between things; and Science generalizes these readings under what are called "scientific laws". These laws, by their very nature, are hypothetical, since they are arrived at on the basis of whatever readings Science has *so far taken*. Thus a scientific law or hypothesis holds good only until the morrow, until further readings are received. "Descartes used to commiserate the Ionians. Descartes in his turn makes us smile, and no doubt someday our children will laugh at us," so say the more enlightened scientists. Science can therefore do no more than keep adjusting and re-adjusting her laws, keep "patching up every leak." And so Science will limp along behind the happenings of a universe like the faithful servant ever and again trying to vibrate in harmony with an unknown and changing master. At every point it finds itself faced with something new, finds itself faced with more search to do; and Science must keep on searching if it is to exist.

This fate has befallen Science not for any other reason but solely because it reads something *through something else*. It treats any phenomenon only objectively. Any force or energy or phenomenon that Science needs to tackle, that must be accessible through something else. To Science the work done by a force is the only measure of the force; it reads the force through the work done by that force. But the fact that we know work is done tells us hardly anything about the force itself.

To be sure, Science talks a lot of "mass" and "force" and through its hypotheses regarding the combination of these two Science has achieved a lot. But Science does not even know what they are. To the question: What is mass? One scientist would say: "It is the product of the volume and the density." To which another would reply: "It were better to say that density is the quotient of the mass by the volume." To the question: What is force? One would say: "That which moves or tends to move a body." Another would say: "It is the product of the mass by the acceleration." Still another would reply: "Then why not say that mass is the quotient of the force by the acceleration?" What can we do with these definitions? Finally, we have to agree with Poincaré that we are left with a definition which of course is a confession

of failure: *Masses are co-efficients which it is found convenient to introduce into calculations*. Really we need no definitions of either mass or force. The concepts of mass and force are ancient enough. We have had direct experience of them from our childhood.

Many and varied are the hypotheses that Science evolves for its explanation of phenomena. As to whether such things actually exist or not, that the scientists are quick to leave to others to determine, notably to the metaphysicians. The "ether" is one fine example. As to the problem of its existence the scientists want the metaphysicians to solve. The scientists are only interested in the fact that the ether offers them a convenient hypothesis till such time as they can find something better.

The essential nature of any hypothesis is that it is provisional. That is, it is adopted pending further investigation. The same holds good for a scientific hypothesis. And the scientist knows, or at least should know, that the finale of his work is the rejection of the hypothesis with which he now works. Were it not so, Science cannot exist. Were there a full or even an adequate comprehension of actuality, then there would be no Science, just as much as there would then be no Religion!

Religion begins with a contradiction, is founded on a contradictory basis. Science begins with a hypothesis, is founded on a principle which for the moment is workable; and the subsequent rejection of that hypothesis is an enriching of the contents of Science. Dahlke terms this rejection of the already held hypothesis a "contradiction in the conclusion". But this phrase, which is an English translation from the German, might be to some extent misleading, though in a particular sense is acceptable. The contradictory basis of Religion is something which permeates the entire length and breadth of Religion, from beginning to end, and inaccessible to living experience, thus proving itself to be untruth. Science therefore has a far greater right to hold a place in the court of actuality. And whereas Science welcomes such a "contradiction", Religion fears it and continuously shuns it.

Science claims to have netted in all the happenings of the universe within its law called the Law of Conservation of Energy. Most of its other laws actually express this same fundamental law; they only take different forms. But this law, is not a law that Science has along its usual path discovered. That is, it is not a law that Science has arrived at by scientific experiment. It is one which Science has conceived as what is called an *ultimate concept*, an assumed ideal. Science can never conclusively prove this law. For the simple reason that Science can never achieve what it itself calls a *completely reversible process*, which again is an ultimate concept. To achieve complete reversibility Science must first find a completely isolated system.

That is, it must find a system which does not dissipate to or assimilate from the outside any form of energy whatsoever. Such a system cannot be found. If one has in mind all the forms of energy perceivable, such a system is an inconceivability. Even if one assumes that the quantitative relations between forms of energy as adopted by Science are correct, a complete transformation of energy, known in Applied Science as a hundred per cent. efficiency, is not attainable. The quantitative relations adopted in Science, as for example, one joule is equivalent to ten million ergs, are only *approximations*. And that exact relations cannot be arrived at is also to be laid down to this fact of not being able to find a completely isolated system. Science can therefore only approximate to the Law of Conservation of Energy, just as much as it can experimentally only approximate to Newton's Laws of Motion.

If the Law of Conservation of Energy is to be applied to the universe with all its variegated processes, then one would have to treat the universe as a definitely circumscribed and closed up, finite system, containing a definite amount of energy however incalculable that amount be. Such a treatment is an unthinkability, and being so, Science would then only be preaching—just as Religion does—an incomprehensibility, which has to be accepted on mere faith. Thus, Science will move towards Religion. In point of fact, it always does when its concepts are traced to the very end. If, on the other hand, the universe were treated as an infinite, why then, where lies the possibility of applying to it any law that talks of the inability to create or to destroy? For to create or to destroy means to add or to subtract; and we are told that infinity plus or infinity minus yet remains infinity. The concept of mathematical infinity is nevertheless playing an important part in Science, and without it there would be no Science, because there would then be no generalizing. Science here becomes the subject of banter to the truth seeker.

In every computation in Science something is neglected, and by means of these neglects Science achieves a great deal. "Science has almost made greater progress through what she has known how to ignore than by which she has taken into account." Were nothing to be neglected in a problem in Science, the problem would ever remain beyond solution. Such factors as are neglected take the form of "assumptions." In truth, when I make an assumption in a scientific computation, what I am doing is neglecting some factor or factors, which, if taken into account, will make my computation so involved that I would find it impossible to work. The purely hypothetical character of Science is thus seen. It holds good only up to a point.

Pure Science as against Applied Science is really the mental life of the scientist, which is no more than

a dabbling in concepts—a process which I should describe as a *rational systematization of concepts*. Geometry is one fine example. In truth it is not concerned with bodies that actually exist. "Its object is certain ideal solids, absolutely invariable which are but a simplified and very remote image of them. The concept of these ideal bodies is entirely mental, and experiment is but the opportunity which enables us to reach the idea." (Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*). Consequently the question as to whether geometry with its line without breadth and point without size is true or not, is a meaningless question. "We might as well ask whether the metric system is true."

When conceptually treated things lead one into insoluble problems. Insoluble cosmological problems, insoluble biological problems, and the like, are the dead ends for the two opposites of Religion and Science. Thus they afford no complete or even an adequate explanation to things. Each time an answer, but an answer which becomes a question. At every point in its path Science opens up a "new and endless series." Thus for Science, the inevitable fate: Always new ground, more ground traversed, but the goal, if at all there is one, still equally far.

Why then is this the outcome?

The answer to that is to be found in the fact that both Religion and Science live by the concept. They both judge things by the concept, and the validity of one concept through another concept, a procedure which must go on and on without an end, for the concept which now sits in judgment over the other concept must be judged in turn. Thus there goes on a continuous movement, a continuous flow of conceptual thought leading to no known goal. Where there goals are concerned both Religion and Science are absolutely at sea. They long for a goal; and they hope for a goal. But that is all. To use the Buddha's simile, they are like the man who loves the most beautiful lady in the land without knowing in the least who she is or where she is to be found. "Just as if a man should say: 'How I long for, how I love the most beautiful lady in the land!'" (*Digha Nikaya* 9, and elsewhere).

If now we turn into a closer analysis of Religion and Science, and therewith to the bulk of human thought, we have naught to do but to examine the concept itself. And the defects in both Religion and Science are to be traced to the fundamental defect of the concept. The unsatisfying nature of both Religion and Science are to be found in the unsatisfying nature of that thing upon which they are both built—the concept. Whatever that lives by the concept must carry in itself the defects of the concept. And the shocking revelation dawns to the truth-seeker that the concept, far from being a satisfactory instrument to probe into

actuality, works with a *fundamental opposition* to actuality! That is, the concept makes out definitely circumscribed identities or entities out of things. But actuality knows no such entities, permits no such circumscribings. Actuality is all movement, all action. It is what the Buddha defines as a *Becoming* (*bhava*).

The fact is that all thinking sets in with this opposition to truth, with the cementing of the *is* and not with the realization of the basic fact of *becoming*. And until this characteristic of actuality is perceived nothing of actuality is rightly perceived.

That all the concepts of Religion and Science are incessantly found wanting is to be found simply in the fact that for the concept there must be a definitely circumscribed "object." Though visually an "object" remains an entity for a period of time, in truth it does not. However minute, there yet goes on a relentless changing, a becoming. We can give a name or attach a fixed label to a thing only because the change that goes on in it is so gradual and slow that for all practical purposes it is ineffective. Actually the name by which we define a thing is no more than a label which we give to a particular part of a *process*. We hypothetically postulate a beginning and an end to a process that knows no beginning, and that part of the process which is bound by these limits is that which we define as "object," attaching a name to it in addition. And whether a scientist describes the world as "a rational entity behind which stands a supreme intellect" or as a some other kind of entity, that matters little. It speaks of the same fundamental opposition to actuality with which all thinking sets in.

The concept extracts out of causality bogus entities, which present themselves to the concept *as such* in dependence on the standpoint adopted by the conceptual thinker. He then follows up the relations between these concepts, bringing forth in the process further concepts anew. This rational systematization of concepts, called Science, must avoid plunging into the infinite past to look for a beginning to these processes, for the inevitable outcome is the ending up in incomprehensibility. The other course to follow is to postulate a "cause-in-itself" and assume that, because of the incomprehensibilities to the human mind that follow therefrom, one can know nothing of actuality except by a process of Divine Revelation. The "cause-in-itself" is made to reveal itself to a particular mind. And one has no alternative but to believe what has filtered through that chosen medium and be saved, or disbelieve in it and be damned! That is the course of Religion. Philosophy is to a certain extent responsible for driving men towards Revelation. For he who hits himself against the dead ends to which philosophy impels him, finds in the dogma of Revelation the only way out. If all this philosophizing, with its agnosticisms and scepticisms, only leads me to these dead ends beyond

which no progress can be made, then I can know nothing further except through some Divine Revelation. And the only way out it would be for me, but for Buddhism!

Here within the nature of the concept we find Religion and Science in union, even though their manners of functioning may be ever so opposite. The *sufficient reason* for them is the same, and that being so, both of them can give no satisfactory explanation to things. They both set in with the same fundamental opposition to truth.

I say it again, there are no definite "objects" to form definite "concepts" of. There are only processes, just as much as there are no concepts but *only a process of conceiving*! Logic can function only if there are definite "concepts," and for the concept there must be finitely conceived "objects" which stand either identical or contradictory. The inapt nature of logic as an instrument of wisdom can be seen by this. For instance, how can logic talk of a Law of Contradiction in the fashion, "Nothing can both be and not be" where entities do not exist so as to permit the applicability of a "to be" or a "not to be." It is only he who can perceive this fundamental nature of actuality that can see the wisdom behind that statement of the Buddha when with that refined humour he often displays in the face of the so-called "wise," he says: "There are wise men who call day night, and night day." To them therefore who must remain within the domains of logic with all its laws of identities and contradictions, its syllogisms and paralogisms, its principles and definitions, the Buddha-word becomes so disturbing that it confounds all their laws of thinking, and they can do nothing with it but profanely yell at it! "The man should have had a metaphysical training!" Or, "The man lacks logical training!" Not that the Buddha himself did not come across such empty rebukes by people proud of their own ignorance. Even worse things were said of him in his day. Is it then a wonder that such minds cannot perceive how Buddhism can teach that "only suffering is but no sufferer exists."

Conceptual thought comprehends things either *a priori* or *a posteriori*; and to conceptual thought a thing *is* or *is not*, is *eternal* or *not eternal*, is *finite* or *infinite*, and so on. But the happenings of the universe, actuality, does not permit of such a mode of comprehension, nor of such a manner of description. "This world, Kaccayana, usually bases (its view) on two things; on existence and on non-existence. Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of the world as it really is, does not hold with the non-existence of the world. But he, who with right insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is, does not hold with the existence of the world. Grasping after systems, imprisoned by dogmas is this world, Kaccayana, for the most part . . . Everything exists:—this is ore

extreme. Nothing exists:—this is the other extreme. Overcoming these two extremes the Tathagata teaches you the Doctrine in the Middle.” (*Samyutta Nikaya II*).

Let one grasp this in all its force if one is to understand the Buddha-word, and also the Buddha’s attitude towards many questions that the uninstructed man puts. Or else one’s thinking can claim to be hardly more useful for the attainment of Wisdom than the thinking of an Aristotle who found fault with those who did not adhere to logic! It is pleasing to note, however, that of late the West has begun to shake herself of the “wholly pernicious results” accruing from the adoption of Aristotelian logic.

Amidst the scientists too we find the more enlightened minds perceiving this fundamental defect of common thinking, that is of making entities out of things: “If we ask for instance whether the position of the electron remains the same we must say “no”; if we ask whether the electron’s position changes with time we must say “no”; if we ask whether the electron is at rest we must say “no.” The Buddha has given such answers when interrogated as to the condition of a man’s self after death; but they are not familiar answers for the tradition of seventeenth and eighteenth century science.” The answers that the Buddha has given are not answers that are familiar or accessible to the common laws of thinking with their “either this or that,” “yes or no,” “being or non-being,” “is or is not,” and such other maxims. He who can and must think only in such terms will find Buddhism, as I have already mentioned, a little too disturbing. But he who is ready to free himself from the already fashioned concepts and ideas and notions, and is willing to do some patient and deep reflection, shall find in Buddhism the only thing which in the final analysis is worthy of the truth-seeker.

Where all is a changing, a becoming, entities cannot be found. The Buddha discovered the one nature that runs through all things—*change* (*anicca*); and this unlike others he thought out to the very last! He did not think it out merely to limits that suited his likes and dislikes, or to limits that suited his fancy. No, come what may, he thought it out to its conclusion, to the bitter end. And that same determination and courage is necessary if one is to face the fact of impermanence, and therewith actuality, full in the face.

If now the concept which sits in judgment over things is found to be no longer competent for the task of truth-seeking, one is given to face the problem: *What is the sufficient reason for its incompetence?* Or in other words, one is faced with the problem: *Why does the concept set in with a fundamental opposition to actuality?*

Without further words, it is clear that the answer to this is to be found not in anything else but in the

process of conceiving. The task that lies before the truth-seeker therefore, is not to judge one concept by another concept such as is done by Religion and Science, bringing up in the process answers which in turn become questions, but to deal with the problem: *How does the concept arise, and what is the sufficient reason it to so arise?*

Religion and Science here fall by the road; for the concept which up to now has been the judge of all things, is now to be judged. Yet, if that judgment is not to be through other concepts, not by the common mode of thought, for reasons just shown, where lies the means by which comprehension and judgment can be achieved?

This is the point where all conceptual thinking, that trafficking in ideas, reveals its valuelessness in the end. From here onwards nothing can be proved from a standpoint outside the object of proof; yet no belief is demanded. Here one has to experience it all by oneself, and naught save one’s experience can tell. Here one has to prove things to oneself, through oneself, the Teacher being only a guide. For the means that is available is no longer a means that is accessible to the apparatus of Science, yet is not a means that lies beyond accessibility to oneself—*mental insight*.

To develop this insight one has to still this trafficking in concepts. It is very akin to the stilling of abstract and discursive thought (*vitakka-vicara*), or the stilling of the so-called “inner speech” which in the Buddhist training one is called upon to achieve. One has to quietly let his mind rest on things with pointed attention, and reflect until, so to say, light breaks forth. Insight also arises through a particular process of development (*bhavana*) for which deep concentration is essential. This process of development is commonly referred to as “meditation”, a word which I think is not quite appropriate especially in view of the mysticism attributed to it.

All wisdom ultimately lies in this—*insight*. Learning cannot take the place of insight, because learning affords only concepts. For this reason we find that “men of learning soon get out-dated; but wise men remain wise for all time.” Under the Buddha’s guidance we find that some of the most unlearned of men, scavengers, slaves, murderers, making the necessary effort, attaining the goal of Enlightenment, whilst on the other hand, the most erudite of Brahmins, learned in all the Vedas and theories, not as much as sensing anything worthy in what he taught. So is it also that, today, one can lay the Buddha-word before the most educated of men and still not be sure that it will take a hold on his mind. It will in all probability become to him just another garment to adorn himself in. So “overheated” with theories and drowned in concepts would his mind be, that only a rude shock

can awaken him to the characteristics of his very existence.

All bits of wisdom have come about in this one manner. Sometimes they are referred to as intuitions, or as products of intuitive wisdom. Many of the most workable laws of Science too have come to their authors as such intuitions, as immediate apprehensions. Such an apprehension is not something that can be arrived at solely by a process of induction, deduction, synthesis, analysis, and so on. It is something that *grows* in one. It flashes into one's mind. Of such growth also is the Buddha-Knowledge, *bodhi*. It is not something that the Buddha arrived at by a process of induction or deduction, or by a process of logical reasoning. It is something that blossomed forth in him, flashed into him from within. It is something that grew in the ascetic Gotama as he sat rapt in the depths of concentration beneath that Bo-tree on that hallowed spot on the banks of Neranjara. Into it he was *awakened*, to call himself the *Awakened One*. Of that same awakening the Buddha said: "And I discovered that profound truth, so difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, tranquillizing, sublime, which is not to be gained by mere reasoning, and is visible only to the wise." (*Majjhima Nikaya* 26).

Apart from speculation, apart from specious reasoning, and apart from the vociferations of a bankrupt conceptual thought, lies Knowledge so difficult to realize. It is this latter that the Buddha discovered and offers others to show the way to discover. "These, monks, are those other things, profound, difficult to realize, hard to understand, tranquillizing, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathagata, having himself realized and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with truth, should speak." (*Digha Nikaya* 1).

What we therefore have to strive for is not to increase our learning, not to add to the already heaped up mass of concepts, but to attain to right insight. Or, what is needed is, to use Whittier's phrase, "a higher wisdom than the babbling schoolmen know."

Controversial and dialectical problems arise only where things are treated as entities—"solar system," "world," "mind," "body," "life," etc. A logical concept becomes like a two-edged sword with which one can cut either way he chooses. And it is only where actuality is conceived along such channels that no satisfaction is to be found in the end. Each side has much right as the other, and as much wrong. But where one sees and experiences actuality as that which it really is,—that is as a *becoming*, to which applies that statement of the Buddha: "All is a burning, monks." (*Sabbam bhikkhave addittam*.)—there one dis-

cerns no possibility of a definite circumscribing any part of it and holding any part of it in the fashion of a by-itself. There no possibility lies for the "dissecting" of things with the concept and so of postulating absolute beginnings to them however alluring such dissections be. There one sees all these apparently opposite things merging into one another within the passage of actuality which is all action, all a becoming.

The Buddha teaches that there is no question of "What burns" or "Who suffers." There is only a *burning* and a *suffering*. At long last the nuclear scientists appear to be seeing these. But even if they see the first, as applied to the world-mass, whether they will see the second, the more important one, as applied to themselves—that is a matter for conjecture. Where these are seen, there no problems of a controversial and dialectical nature arise. There no insoluble cosmological problem arise. There no insoluble biological problems arise. For these are all artificial problems held together by artificial fences created by conceptual thought. "The theory, Vaccha, that the world is eternal, is a jungle, a wilderness, a puppet show, a writhing, and a fetter, and is coupled with misery, ruin, despair, and agony, and does not tend to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, Nibbana. This is the objection I perceive to these theories, so that I have not adopted any one of them." Vaccha then questions the Buddha as to any theories that the Buddha holds. "But has Gotama any theory of his own?" To which the Buddha replies: "The Tathagata, Vaccha, is free from all theories." (*Majjhima Nikaya* 72).

Buddhism takes up things where Religion and Science leave them. Philosophy also claims to do likewise. But philosophy falls short very badly in that though it sees the miseries and the disappointments of life, unlike Buddhism it provides no solution, and so can lead the philosopher into frustration once he has come up against the dead ends of thought. Philosophers have often had their hearts and heads at variance. Their actions have not been in keeping with their doctrines. If Berkeley's actions were consistent with his idealism then he could not have been a clergyman. What their reason doubts, that they leave their hearts to decide. Kant's reasoning for instance, saw nothing wrong in suicide, but he certainly felt it was a wrongful act.

Much has been said, heard, and argued upon as to whether Buddhism is a religion or a philosophy or a some other already fashioned mode of thought and action. It is only he who does not comprehend what exactly the Buddha was trying to point out that falls into such purposeless controversies, and attempts to attach such labels to Buddhism. In all attempts to push in Buddhism into such ready-made pigeon-holes of human thought, what invariably happens is that in the process one loses the essential features of the Buddha-

word. One also often hears that Buddhism is scientific. All this is shallow thinking, myopic viewing, not worthy of the genuine truth-seeker.

J. Larmor is correct when he says that: "The irresistible impulse to atomize everything thus proves to be not merely a disease of the physicist; a deeper origin, in the nature of knowledge itself, is suggested." When followed to the very end all common thinking perforce leads to the concept of a "cause-in-itself" behind all things. What matters whether Spinoza calls this "substans," or Kant and Schopenhauer call it the "thing-in-itself," or Einstein calls it the "supreme intellect," or Aristotle calls it the "prime-mover-unmoved," or the theologians call it "God," or may be some others call it "that-which-gives-continuity-to-the-process." They are all names given to the dead end that lies in the blind alley of conceptual thought. And all such conceiving, when it comes to a case of practical application, leads one to the concept of an *I*,

a Self, in oneself. All criticism of thought boils down to the criticism of this concept of a "by-itself" whether in the context of God or Self. But all such criticisms by themselves give no answer to the problem. For things themselves do not point to either the acceptance or the non-acceptance of such a thing *conceptually*. Thus all those criticisms, as for example, Hume's, are as someone said: "Perfect,—but dead!"

I now conclude this exposition of the problem of thought with the questions: Where lies the possibility for both these fundamental reactions of human thought—Religion and Science? What is the sufficient reason for both these fundamental views? And therewith, does there lie a way that shall lead the seeker to a complete and right understanding of actuality whence he would be able to say to himself: Done is what was to be done; laid down the burden; there is nothing more to come herefrom?

The answer to these is—the *pure Buddha-word*.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

IF now I follow up the questions with which I concluded the previous chapter, I come up with the basis on which all things are present to me *as such*—Consciousness!

Religion teaches: There is a something not demonstrable behind all things. Science says: Such an idea is to be rejected in principle; everything should be demonstrable through something else. Now, both these views are possible only in this, that both Religion and Science have not grasped the foundation on the basis of which they carry out their building operations. The view of Religion is possible only by reason of the fact that in not comprehending this fundamental basis it makes of the latter an in-demonstrability, an incomprehensibility. Religion hides its lack of understanding Consciousness by preaching the dogma of a soul or a metaphysical Self behind oneself, a something that the senses cannot perceive. The same trend of thought is followed by Religion to matter and the universe as a whole, and the inevitable result is the assumption of a something not perceptible to the senses lying behind all these—God.

These two concepts, God and soul, spring from common ground; and in religious thought they support one another, just like two sticks standing on common ground stay supporting each other. Of these two, which arises first? To that the answer is not God, but soul, or *I*. The *I*-concept sets in first before the God-concept. A little child will well have in him the concept of an *I* though he may not have any concept whatsoever of a "cause-in-itself" behind all things.

And the accentuation of the *I*-concept or the *I*-consciousness is simply by reason of not rightly comprehending Consciousness. To this I shall come to in more detail later.

How now does the same lack of comprehension cut the path for Science? And where lies the possibility for the view of Science to exist? Science says that everything should be accessible and demonstrable. Thus far Science is right. Consciousness is also an accessibility. My consciousness is accessible to me and demonstrates itself to me. But Science goes a step further, and in going this further step, finds itself in difficulties. For this next step that Science takes is: Not only must everything be merely demonstrable, but it must also be demonstrable *through something else*. This "through something else" is where Science is let down with regard to Consciousness. For my consciousness is something that is demonstrable *only to myself*. It is the one thing in the whole world that is wholly and truly accessible to me *and only to me*. How much valueless Science becomes in the final analysis can be seen from the fact that the one actuality that matters to me at all is that actuality which is beyond all demonstration, beyond all comprehension by Science, my consciousness. It is a phenomenon that puts to defiance the most exact of Science. The aim of Science is to work out and thereby predict things in advance. But however efficiently Science computes within the material world, predicts the happenings of such a world, there remains one thing that defies all its computations. Not all the scientists in the world, not all the scientific

apparatus in the world, can say whether I will be thinking of London or of Bombay the next moment. Where Science cannot surely predict the happenings of a material world, what can we expect of its predictions in fields where Consciousness is the problem, such as in therapeutics?

It is now almost universally accepted that Medicine can never be an "exact" Science, even to the extent that the Physical Sciences are. Nevertheless, one wonders whether the men of Medicine are ready to concede the reasons for it; because if they honestly wish to grapple at the whole problem of Suffering, they might not be able to *remain* men of Medicine! Unlike the other branches of Science, Medicine is faced with the most arduous task—to probe into Consciousness itself. It has to directly deal with Consciousness. But unfortunately, being a mode of Science, it has at the time same to deal with Consciousness in an objective manner. The result is that Medicine has incurred the fate of remaining more infirm than the Physical Sciences. It can never be certain whether its prescriptions will have the desired effect, whether the patient will always be cured. With all the accumulated facts and the generalizations accepted, Medicine does not even know what exactly is a "disease," let alone a cure. Where precisely lies the demarcation between disease and not-disease? Any such demarcation will always be hypothetical. When Medicine employs a new drug or a new act of surgery to patch up one leak, it finds that it has only caused some other leak to spring up. Today it proclaims with great delight the discovery of a wonder drug, but tomorrow it warns us against using this same drug, for it is found to cause a disease somewhere else. Certainly one advantage is achieved, but at the same time a disadvantage too. Thus it is that Medicine can do no more than patching up leaks; and all this is called advance.

If men of Medicine are to grasp Consciousness, and therewith Suffering, in all its entirety, then they will have to practise not along the path they now do, but along the path of Buddhism! It is not without good grounds that the Buddha has been described as the Greatest Physician.

Apart from Medicine and its allied sciences like Biology, there are other modes of thought too which attempt to follow up Consciousness and solve its mysteries—notably Psychology. The latter has been given a loose rein, and in its attempt to grasp Consciousness it has found itself deviated from the usual scientific procedure. The result is that there is much doubt as to whether Psychology is a science or not. This does not mean that Psychology has solved the problem of Consciousness. Not by any means. It is only another attempt to read Consciousness objectively, an attempt which by its very nature must always meet with failure,

and even provide food for humorous cartoonists. I remember one such cartoon where an exasperated mother comes bursting into the consulting room of her Psychologist with her unmanageable child and offers the Psychologist four volumes of Child Psychology in exchange for a strong leather belt!

The whole edifice that Science has so successfully and marvellously built is on the unquestioned basis of this thing called Consciousness. And the trouble starts for Science when the basis on which it has built its huge structure is made to stand judgment, when we remind the scientist that in all his thoughtful calculations he is forgetting himself! Consciousness ever remains the terrible "mischief-maker" for Science.

Where Science must face this basic power, one witnesses on the stage a grand comedy of errors. How long we shall have to endure those foolish and cruel acts of the physiologists as they go about with their scalpels and microscopes looking for a "seat" or a "resting-place" for Consciousness, one does not know. Witness that comic scene of the psychologists, and of late of the parapsychologists, with their "psychic vibrations," "telepathic impulses," "etheric waves," "psi," "anspi," and what not? Note that strange but widespread notion that pain is *in* the nerves. The neurologist imagines that he can *see* my pain by means of his instruments. "Pain is carried by the nerves; our instruments tell us that!" Which only means this: Body-consciousness has become the object of eye-consciousness; that pain has become the object of sight! The practically-minded dentist who removes my tooth to relieve me of my tooth-ache might as well say that the tooth-ache was in my tooth. All the numberless instances where cures have been wrought through extra-medical means, only prove how far pain and disease are from being pure and simple physical phenomena as Medicine hypothesize them to be. Is it then a wonder that, even though it has achieved a lot, Medicine is never certain of itself, of its predictions? All this bungling is entirely due to the purely objective manner of envisaging things that Science adopts.

From the purely physiological standpoint there is no reason at all why the body cannot function for all time, why life cannot last for ever; and physiologists know that they cannot find an explanation for it. From the standpoint of Science birth is as much a wonderful phenomenon as death, or even as sleep. Some kind of movement has appeared from nowhere, and likewise has disappeared to nowhere. Science sees birth here and death there as two distinct phenomena that have no connection whatsoever. By reason of this mistaken view Science writes for itself an insoluble problem. Each occurrence as incomprehensible as the other.

If on the other hand it were to be claimed that the Law of Conservation of Energy holds good for life too, then it will have to be proved by the passing over of life from one body to another. If Science attempts such a venture then it will only provide the truth-seeker with another occasion to jibe at Science. For Science would then unwarily be led into accepting the fictitious religious dogma of a "transmigration of souls." Some of the ancient mystics, we hear, tried to entrap the soul as it escaped the dying body by closing up the dying man in an airtight box. But such a vulgar experiment may not be in keeping with the dignity of Science.

Again: From the standpoint of Science the characteristics of the offspring can be nothing more than a combination of the characteristics of the parents—the inability of which view to stand trial in the court of actuality brings us on to the other insoluble problem for Science—a problem to which Religion gives no answer save the pleasure of God—the problem of heredity.

The position of Science with regard to this problem, leads one into Darwin's Theory of Evolution, a theory which horrified the theologians and caused the theological explanation for man's first appearance to be seriously doubted. Let it be remembered at the very outset that the Theory of Evolution is a *theory*, something which, like the "looking-glass" has to be changed in the course of time for something more workable and reliable.

Here an eminent biologist conceived a plan of biological development, and brought in certain data that fitted into his conceived plan, like laying down a mosaic work with available pieces to an already thought out fashion. But it must be said that the original Theory of Darwin made no claims to go so far as the Darwinians have subsequently tried to stretch it out to.

Of the theory itself, *The Origin of Species*, it forms an admirable work, though in the end it becomes as valueless as the explanations of Religion. Even in spite of the fact that it is arresting of more serious thought than the dogmas of Religion, yet it is as much open to criticism as the latter. If Darwin can adopt an "upward" movement to arrive at man starting from prehistoric animal, with the same right can another adopt a "downward" movement to arrive at the lower forms of life starting from man. With the same right that one says man is descended from the species of the apes, one can say that the ape is descended from the species of man. "But we have no firm evidence that apes were descended from the species of man," the Darwinians would say. Does that then by itself prove your case? And how firm is the evidence you

have for your theory, with all your doctrines of the survival of the fittest, of natural selection, and your theories of mutation? Have you traced life into the beginningless past and so found a starting point to justify your assertion of man's gradual descent? The theologians, on their part, prefer to have it that man came from God or from the mouth of Brahman, and not from the apes, and that man's weakness to fall for the charm of the forbidden fruit—with which weakness, incidentally, he appears to have been created—caused the rest. Unfortunately they do not tell us how, where, why and when the animals were created. May be we are to infer that the animals were created as a sideline of amusement for the Creator, barring perhaps those amidst them that can, health permitting, be made victims to the command: Rise, Peter, kill and eat.

To talk of progress or regress there must be a fixed standard of measurement. In actuality we find no such standard which remains eternally fixed so as to always form a measuring rod for the measurement of things. This moment of the universe that now is, is something that never has been or will never again be in all its likeness. The only standards that we have are those that we ourselves postulate. To talk of two different species in Biology has as little sense as to talk of two different energies in Physical Science.

To talk of development in the biological sense means also to imply that all this development started from some point. That means to say that somewhere life appeared all of a sudden, or that somewhere life started to set in—an adequate causelessness again, an imperceptibility. What matters then whether this beginning was in the primordial cell of the biologist or in the Garden of Eden of the theologians? The Book of the Genesis replaced by a biological theory. To the honest thinker, *both equally a matter of faith*, both equally unsatisfying. And however much the defenders of Science may think that the Theory of Evolution and Theology are opposed to one another, yet in their deepest depths they rest in on common ground. Their foundation is the same—*faith in a beginning*. The result is that with all its imposing theories, Evolutionism walks into the throes of Creationism. Thus, Science is the reluctant bedmate of Religion.

On the subject of the inward unity of Faith and Science, Dr. Paul Dahlke deals very cleverly and at length in his book titled *Buddhism and Its Place in the Mental Life of Mankind*—a book which unfortunately is seldom mentioned, and even less read. Dahlke's books on Buddhism stand very eminent amidst all those that have been written by the Western scholars ever since they started writing on the subject. Certainly he does justice to the Teaching, and to him I must pay a tribute.

To Darwin must however be granted that he spoilt the game for the theologians a great deal. That is, he made people to suspect those single and separate acts of creation which the theologians teach. But as Dahlke points out, the fight between the Darwinians and the Church is like the fight between the dog and the wolf. "In the dusk they might pass for mates, were it not that each is busy trying to take a bite out of the other's throat."

We are said to be descended from monkeys!—the theologians exclaimed in horror. Man, the proud creation of the Lord, for which the Lord must ever be praised; this life so worth living, could surely not have been evolved from a soulless creature of the wilds? But if the theologians reflected further they would have realized that Darwin was only putting the same raw idea of the Creation of Man in the Garden of Eden in a scientific manner; was presenting the same basic idea of a beginning to life by fitting the "pawns in the game" into a plan more attractive to the intellect.

The honest thing for any scientist to do here would be to admit with Pierre Le-Comte du Nouy that he does not know anything of the question of a beginning to life. And the scientist who would venture to conclude that when the right environment and the presence of necessary elements such as oxygen and carbon exist, life will occur as a natural corollary, would only be falling into the tormenting "lap" of faith, of mere belief. Not discerning a beginning does not imply an agnosticism. It only implies the understanding of what the Buddha means when he teaches of actuality, *Beginningless (anamatagga)*. To this too I shall come in detail later. Here I would mention that one of the most amazing characteristics of Religious and Scientific thought is that no one seems to be worried about an *end* to everything! It may be an awe-inspiring thought; perhaps that is why people are less interested in it. They are all interested only in beginnings. He who speaks of a beginning must necessarily speak of an end. If Science thinks in terms of the Law of Conservation of Energy it can only come to the conclusion of an endless, and likewise of a beginningless. But yet it loathes the conclusion of a beginningless. To Religion and Science the world has had a beginning in an unaccounted for cause-in-itself, but it will have no end. The Buddha styles those who think in such terms "semi-eternalists." They have blocked the existence of the world somewhere in the past, but they permit it to exist in the future for all time.

The concept of Evolution is not of recent origin. Early Greek philosophers such as Anaximander and Empedocles too spoke of Evolution in some fashion or other. Anaximander thought that living beings were produced from heat and moisture. At first they were of a low order, but gradually evolved into higher organisms

through adaptation to external conditions. Man was at the start a fish living in the water, and the earth was all fluid at the time—he believed. Empedocles regarded Evolution as governed by chance rather than by design and purpose. It was a sort of a survival of the fittest. The origin was certainly fantastic, with all kinds of living things having all manner of forms strewn about the place. By these joining together by chance other beings were evolved, and in the end only particular kinds survived. As his predecessor Anaxagoras did, Aristotle regarded Evolution teleologically; that is, as regulated by an intelligent design and purpose. He also believed in an "internal perfecting tendency" which drives organisms to higher and higher states of perfection—an idea from which Aquinas appears to have borrowed his proof of God by asserting a Perfect. Thus Aristotle postulated distinct steps in the ladder of Evolution: inanimate matter, plant-life, plant-like animal, animal, and finally man. Of more recent times we have Linnaeus, Buffon, Malthus, Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, and the famous Charles Darwin. Linnaeus believed that the origin was a "Special Creation" and subsequent evolutions were post-creations formed by causes such as hybridizing. Buffon, cautious not to incur the wrath of the ecclesiastics, seems to have wavered between Creationism and Evolutionism. He spoke of preventing overcrowding and maintaining the "balance of nature." Malthus also believed in maintaining a "balance of nature." He worked out that the population increases in a geometrical ratio whilst food increases in an arithmetical. Some agent must therefore be incessantly at work maintaining the balance by keeping down the population, and that is why, according to some theologians, the Creator has created small-pox viruses and such other painfully destructive things. One would think that the simplest way for the Creator to keep down the population would be to stop creating further souls. Erasmus Darwin believed in the transmission of "acquired forms of propensities" to descendants, and that the power to develop was "implanted within the original organism by the Creator." No further intervention by this Creator is needed for further development, he tells us. Lamarck believed that Evolution was by the action of environment on the internal structure through the nervous system. Geoffroy St.-Hilaire believed that the change from one species to another occurred by sudden saltations in the embryo.

Much of all this is disguised theology.

Thus, most of Charles Darwin's ideas in Evolution were not of his own origin. But over his predecessors he had the virtue of bringing in data to support this theory. Dahlke describes him as the master-player in the game of biological chess. To it I must add that the master-player could nevertheless not cause a mate! The king still finds its way out.

All these gropings have discovered something or other, one has to give. But of what use are they when they all fall back on faith? They only afford more and more logical ways of interpreting and understanding the same basic concept of Creation, of moulding Adam from the dust. In the end, they only leave room for faith.

The Buddha also taught an Evolution. But not an Evolution from a beginning to an endless! He taught the evolution of actuality, how things actually evolve. But this one can comprehend only after he has comprehended his Doctrine sufficiently well. To it I shall therefore come later.

The problem of heredity is *the* problem that has to be solved here, and as long as this problem remains unsolved, the problems of ontogenesis and phylogenesis also remain unsolved.

Whoever scientist believes in a starting point to life and works out from such an adequate causeless-ness, has no other course to follow but to follow up the same trend of thought to the universe-process as a whole. And then the moving finger having writ will move on, only to point at another adequate causeless-ness at the hands of which the universe has been moulded as a whole—God! So will he end up in faith, with all the writhings, the fetters, the puppet-shows of conceptual thought that follow. So will he thereby remain in the same mire of concepts, leading himself for ever away from the only culmination of mental life that is possible when the glorious Aryan formula can be repeated: Done is what was to be done; laid down the burden; there is nothing more to come herefrom. An inglorious end for a proud scientific thought.

And all this solely because of Religion and Science not rightly comprehending this basic power Consciousness.

I shall have to deal with the difficulties that Science comes up against when confronted with the phenomenon of birth in a later chapter. It would be necessary to understand the Buddha-word to some extent before such can be tackled to satisfaction. In point of fact such is the case everywhere. The errors of Religion and the falling-shortness of Science can be seen only where the Buddha-word is first comprehended. For it is only when actuality is comprehended that error can be seen as error and provisionality as provisionality. Here I will have to be content by saying that when Science comes to the question of birth and death it hits its head upon a rock.

Science now and again thinks of comprehending Consciousness. But for Science to do this it will have to completely change its manner of functioning. Science

always needs a standpoint outside of that object it conceives. To conceive Consciousness Science finds no standpoint outside of it. Science, in every form, is an entering into relation with the external only; but Consciousness is essentially an entering into relation with itself. If Science is to remain in existence it must maintain its falling into relation with the external. And if it is to investigate and comprehend fully what Consciousness is, then it means it has to become Buddhism! That perhaps will never happen. For if that ever happens, then one of two fates must befall Science. It will either blow its own existence asunder, or it will be left by the roadside like a discarded garment, like a relic of a bygone mental life. Consciousness will always keep toying with Science, forcing Science to cut the ground from under its feet in the end; for ultimately, Science is also a becoming conscious.

In its ability to comprehend Consciousness through its adopted procedure, Science reveals its chief infirmity. It finds itself unable to explore and probe into the very foundation on which it builds itself. It is like the man who probes into things with a powerful light and cognizes things in this light, though yet not knowing one bit worthy of what precisely this light is.

In this basic foundation, Consciousness, must lie the key to actuality. For the simple reason that all there is, is something that is conceived on this same basis. Causality, without beginning or end, limitless space, beginningless and endless time—all these present themselves *as such* on the basis of Consciousness. The whole world as it comes to me is something that is based on my consciousness, and being that it is so, second-hand as it were, it remains problematical, it remains—*problem*.

But on that account this assertion is not to be identified with the idealism of the pure spiritualists wherein they come to directly denying matter, or to teaching that the reality of the whole external world is assumed upon faith. Nor is it to be identified with the materialism of the pure atomists on the other extreme. To men like Plato, Leibniz, and Berkeley, there are *only* minds and ideas, and matter is either a "community of souls" or an "idea in the mind of God," or some such thing. To men like Democritus there are *only* atoms or waves of energy. These worthies have not been without their counterparts in India much earlier. In the Buddha's own day there was Agita the pure materialist; Makkhali Gosala the preacher of fate and predestination; Pakudha Kakkayana who taught a monadism of seven monads; and so on.

Idealism and materialism are the extreme boundaries that conceptual thought has postulated in its attempt to show the relationship between the physical and the metaphysical. Each in its turn has come to the fore,

only to give way to the other. In our era the accent seems to be on materialism. But the battle between idealism and materialism is not a matter for surprise when one realizes that both systems are equally inadequate. It is the battle between two systems of faith. "Overcoming these two extremes the Tathagata points out the Doctrine in the Middle."

This fact that the world is present to me *as such*; I repeat—*as such*, on the basis of my consciousness, the Buddha teaches when he says: "Everything I shall show to you, monks. Do ye listen to it. And what, monks, is everything? Sights and eye, sounds and ear, smells and nose, tastes and tongue, touch and body, thoughts and mind. That, monks, is everything. Whoso, monks, should say: 'Rejecting this everything, I will proclaim another everything'—it would be mere talk on his part, and when questioned he could not make good his boast, and further would come to an ill pass. Why so? Because, monks, it would be beyond his scope do to so." (*Samyutta Nikaya IV*).

I know or sense no other world than this "everything" which the Buddha defines in this statement. This is the *actual* mean between idealism and materialism; a collision, which, in the colliding, purges them both of their fictitious natures. That which is right in idealism and that which is right in materialism, here in this Teaching of the Buddha is blended together in complete harmony with actuality.

The question is sometimes asked and debated upon: Can Science oust Religion? Due to the better right that Science holds in the court of actuality over and above Religion, the question as to whether Religion can oust Science does not seem to be coming to men's minds so much. It is always a case of their wondering whether Science can oust Religion, and not *vice versa*. The answer to this question is plain and simple: No. Because in the final analysis both Religion and Science arise from the same basic premise—*faith*! Religion takes its God upon faith. Science takes its Law of Conservation of Energy, on which law all the other laws of Science are based, upon faith. And they both are absolutely "shipwrecked" in the face of the one basis that matters at all and is wholly and entirely accessible to either the Religionist or the Scientist—*Consciousness*.

That is how, very concisely, the problem of Science ousting Religion resolves itself from the standpoint of thought. This question is also viewed from the standpoint of the effects that Science will have on the morals founded by Religion. That is, by this question is meant: Can the amoral materialism of Science oust the noble and moral principles which Religion purports man to follow?

To which the reply is:

Scientific progress alone cannot make man immoral or irreligious. What can make man more immoral, or for that matter more moral, is something that is to be found and nourished within man himself. What exactly that is, I make not attempt to discuss just yet. I shall call the attention of the reader to it some time later. Here I would only mention that if the discoveries of Science are treated as articles of knowledge, then Science cannot be instrumental in stripping man of his morals. But what happens is that these discoveries are utilized for the purpose of making sense-pleasures accessible to more and more men in more and more diverse ways. And the man, ignorant of himself, is only waiting to cling to these offerings of Science and in the process fashion his morals just sufficient to keep him away from the Criminal Courts. Religion can keep blasting away from house-tops. But that is just how things are moving in the moral sphere where Religion imagines it is having a hold.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to think that Science alone can deprive man of his morals or of his beliefs in Absolutes and Ultimates. Primitive man too craved for the things of his world however simple they may have been, with equal vigour. He too had his own concepts of and beliefs in Absolutes and Ultimates however raw they may have been. There is not one bit of evidence to the contrary. It is all the same, now as before—Ignorance nourished by Thirst.

I now sum up the problem of Consciousness in relation to the main fundamental grooves of human thought, Religion and Science, in the following words:

To Religion, Consciousness is an act of God; and so remains for ever beyond reach. To Science, Consciousness is an in-demonstrability; and so remains for ever beyond reach. To Religion it is a beyond reach because it *assumes* it a beyond reach by reason of its lack of understanding. To Science it is a beyond reach because of the *infirmity of its procedure*. In their non-comprehension of this basic power Consciousness, in the exclusion of this basic power from their world-conceptions, Religion and Science are joined at the root. It has been said that "Newton banished God from nature; Darwin banished him from life; Freud drove him from his last fortress, the soul." This is an overestimate of the labours of these thinkers. It is not a statement that is altogether correct. Up to a point, yes. But if these men's doctrines are followed to their very roots, then a concept of God, in some fashion or other, is found to be hidden dark and obscure. Here I quote that very true statement of Dahlke: "The exclusion of consciousness takes its revenge in the introduction of God into the universe. Where the world becomes

a pure mechanism there God becomes a conceptual necessity." Yea, revenge is taken in that in the introduction of the concept of God and thought is worked out therefrom, it leads itself into a writhing. Yea again, there God becomes a conceptual *necessity* to him who comprehends not and excludes this basic power. There God becomes the necessary energizing force required to keep the "clockwork" going—a clockwork wherein not even a hair falls from my head without his approval, a mechanism wherein not my will but thine be done. There only must man have

to accept commandments. There only must he fall on bended knees and pray. There only do critical expositions become heretical blasphemy. So it also that by reason of this deep inward bond between Religion and Science, we find Religion celebrating at the sight of the scientist who, whilst having to maintain the heritage of a never-ending search, has at the same time his own concept of God lurking in the innermost depths of his mind, whether such concept be in the physico-theological sense as adopted by an Einstein or in the raw sense of a father which art in heaven.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH FOR A STANDPOINT

IF I view the problem of comprehending actuality from a different angle, I come up with what I should call *the search for the standpoint*.

To merely say that something is good is as incomplete and controversial as merely saying that it is bad. Good, bad, moral, immoral, worthy, unworthy—all these have no meaning unless the standpoints from which they are conceived are first defined. Unending arguments and the like arise simply because the duelists do not clearly define the standpoints they adopt. Something is good when viewed from a particular standpoint whilst it is bad when viewed from a different standpoint. All conflicts are conflicts between standpoints. A conceiving something on the basis of one standpoint, and the conceiving of that same thing on the basis of another standpoint—the coming together of the two means conflict! And conflict it will always be so long as the standpoints remain different.

The question then comes: Is there no possibility of maintaining a common and everlasting standpoint for the final judgment of all things? In other words, is there in actuality something that permits itself of being an everlasting measuring rod; something that, by actually remaining the same for all time, forms a means whereby one can measure other things—a sort of a court of highest appeal. For example, is there in actuality an eternal good, or an eternal bliss, unchanging, permanent, lasting for all time from eternity to eternity? From such a standpoint, or in relation to such a thing, I can then measure all other things, and therefore these other things will have exactly the same value in all times

and at all times, whatever society be or whatever the concepts of people be.

Religion will be quick to answer this question: Yes, there is; and that is God. But that is only another way of saying: I do not know. Or more accurately, another way of saying: In actuality I myself cannot perceive such a thing; but nevertheless I take it upon faith that there *must* be such a thing, and I give the name God to it.

The first wise step one takes here is to realize that there is in actuality no such thing. No possibility is there for such a thing to exist. For the basic or fundamental character of actuality is *Impermanence* (*anicca*). Actuality is a *becoming*. Something *becomes* something else. Anything underlying and causing all this becoming, a permanent substratum—such a thing one cannot discern. Between things one finds *similarities*; and one finds a *continuity* in things. But that similarity is only in certain respects; no complete identicalness can be found. In the continuity of things no basic thing permanently residing identical and giving the continuity can be found. I am seeing. There is a continuity to the seeing, and between the various sights there is a similarity in that they are all brought about in the same manner. But no underlying agent or object lies behind the seeing, such as for instance an *I*. One moment of consciousness gives way to another moment of consciousness. In that they are both moments of consciousness one would say that they have a similarity, even a very near identity. But yet they are not identical totally and entirely in *all* respects. This moment of the

universe arose from the last. But even though one may discern a continuity and a near identity in the two universes, yet they are not wholly identical. And so is it that with a changing scheme of things one can do nothing but adopt hypothetical standpoints or adopt standpoints which hold good only within presupposed limits, only within certain periods of time.

All human demeanour is judged on the basis of what is conceived as moral and immoral. Religion in practice is the manifestation of what it posits as moral. Science on the other hand has no time for such things. Science is amoral. Morality and immorality have no place in Science. But as with the problem of the concept the validity of religious morality depends entirely on the validity of the standpoint of morality adopted by Religion. And the hypothetical nature of Religious morality is seen when one sees that the inexorable law of impermanence does not exclude the concepts of morality and immorality from its domain. That which we consider to be moral today was not considered so in an era that has passed, and will not be considered so in an era to come. "That which was reckoned immoral at that time, Vasettha, is now reckoned to be moral." (*Digha Nikaya* 27). People's ideas of morality too are subject to the relentless law of change. Religion will only limp along behind the concepts of morality that its adherents will have from time to time. And struggle as Religion may to gain supremacy in the battle of the concepts of morality, sooner or later it will succumb to the concepts of morality that society will compel its individuals to have. Little would it matter whether that morality of Religion were proclaimed to be as decreed by a higher power or as an outcome of a Divine Revelation. In fact, the reason why we find many a diverse interpretation of religious dictums is that those who first proclaimed those dictums did so on the basis of hypothetical standpoints. None of them could arrive at a standpoint that could be described as a standpoint beyond change. To take a simple example, the followers of the Islamic faith today wrangle over whether Mohammed adopted the standpoint that a man could be considered moral were he to have more than one wife if economic considerations permitted. In the era of Mohammed the structure of society may have been such that polygamy for man was considered harmless and approvable by society. But as the old order changeth that standpoint of judgment for this same action is forced to stand trial. The caste doctrines of the ancient Brahmanic teachings

in India are others that have met with the same fate. A tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye changes with the passage of time to a holding the other cheek when slapped on the one cheek. So long as the process of life, taken both in the individual and the collective sense, proceeds, all axioms promulgated for the fashioning of such a process will keep struggling against the onslaughts of a remorseless Transcendency.

"God is only God," someone said, "inasmuch as He is the Moral Governor of the world." For him who must believe in a creator-God this certainly is a good proposition to follow in order to lead a moral life. But this God has only a provisional value to the truth-seeker until "morality" has stood trial in the court of actuality, until the standpoint from which its author conceives morality is also known and evaluated. Here morality is as much hypothetical as any other concept, for the standpoint of morality adopted here will never remain fixed for all time, and therefore the God will also shift with the shift of the standpoint. Thus this God will also be just like one of those many other Gods—a historical God—that keeps changing his views and ideas of morality along with the men who create him in their own images.

That is only as far as the standpoint of morality goes. The same holds good in other fields of thought too. The incessant and unending search for ideals is also a search for ultimate standpoints of judgment. The search for an ideal form or beauty, aesthetics, is a search for a fixed standpoint of judgment for what is beautiful and ugly. The same applies in the other fields of human endeavour, whether it be in the field of ethics, or in the field of politics, or in some other. Progress and regress, advance and retard—for all these to be decided upon once and for all time, there must be found a standpoint of judgment that would remain unchanged and fixed for all time.

In his *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas claims to give us five proofs of the existence of God. One of these is that we find different kinds of perfections in the world, and so these must have their genesis in something wholly perfect. This wholly perfect is God, so Aquinas tells us. Apart from the fact that there is no perceivable reason why one *must* necessarily assume a perfect genesis, the shallowness of this mode of thought can be seen in that the concept of "perfection" is by no means a fixed thing. That which is considered perfection today has

not always been and will not always be considered so. The standpoint of perfection one postulates will depend entirely on the concepts one has of things. And not only do people's concepts of these things change, these things themselves change. Thus the standpoint of perfection also changes in accordance. A perfection which will always remain a perfection—such a thing one cannot perceive amidst the actualizations of the universe. To talk of such a thing is to merely think in the fashion: There *must* be a perfect, though I do not know anything about it! And that is precisely what Aquinas does. Consequently like all other divinity-dealers, the best he can do for a description of his perfect is to preach an imperceptibility by resorting to logical sophistry and specious reasoning. Like all his other attempts to prove the existence of God, this too is a poor attempt. It is just another outcome of Aquinas' trying to make Aristotle who was considered in the West as *the* thinker of the time fall in line with Christian dogma. As already mentioned Aristotle taught of an intelligence behind the universe and of an "internal perfecting tendency" in his teleological explanation to evolution.

To Aquinas and his like the truth-seeker says: Before you begin to search you have already found. "Thou would'st not seek me if thou had'st not found me." No honest search by yourself is necessary because it is already given to you in your faith, and you are permitted to seek only in as far as your seekings lead to what has already been given to you in the faith. If of course you can find anything to support your beliefs, well and good. If you cannot, why then, all you have to do is to fall back on Divine Revelation. The preachings of such a one, however imposing they be, have no useful content, and is valueless to the truth-seeker; for such a one is first and foremost not a truth-seeker, but a believer. And such a one's efforts at philosophizing are merely attempts to find reasons to support that which he has been made to believe. First belief, and then reasons to support that belief. It would be well for such a one to pay heed to the Buddha's admonishings to the Kalamas of Kesaputta, especially to the eighth of the ten "nots" therein: "Do not go upon approval of a thought-over notion" (*ma annatra ditthinijjhanakhantiya*). And I say with all the best intentions that it would be so much better for people like Augustine and Aquinas to only repeat the Sermon of the Mount and lay off at that. Had just this and only this been done by the theologians of old, there

would then in all likelihood not have been perpetrated all those theological cruelties that history has been stained with. But to go about trying the validity of the Sermon of the Mount in the court of actuality on the basis of a cause-in-itself and divine revelation—that would be disastrous. To the honest truth-seeker, who with Prince Siddharta sets out not to seek a god to worship and ask favours from here or hereafter, but to discover "what is right" (*kin kusalo*), one exposition of one single aspect of actuality is of immensely more value than a thousand commandments.

Within this struggle for the standpoint we see the highest and fullest significance of the inexorable and relentless law of Impermanence. By reason of the ruling law of all things there is brought about a search for a standpoint which will ever remain fixed and unchanging.

Thus it is clear that the value of a teaching, or the greatness of a doctrine to the truth-seeker, depends entirely upon the final standpoint that it adopts for the judgment of things. And the greatest or most valuable of all doctrines will therefore be that doctrine which adopts not a standpoint that is historical such as for instance Religion does, but a standpoint which may be described as super-historical; that is, a standpoint beyond change.

The question then is: Is there the possibility of a standpoint in actuality beyond change?

Here again one has nothing left to do but to join with the Buddha and think out *change* to the bitter end. But before one can do this, that is comprehend *change* to its very conclusion, one has to first free himself of all ideas he would invariably have had of underlying substrata and so on. The first reaction of human thought is to trace things towards such an intranscient and imperishable thing that actually exists as the basis of all things. Even the mind of Heraclitus, who in Western philosophy contributed most vigorously and effectively to the fact of Transcendency and Becoming, could not escape from being caught in the snare. He too, notwithstanding all his doctrines of change, did allow *something* to exist eternally. Thus to the question: Is there the possibility of a standpoint beyond change? Buddhism gives the answer: In the actual sense there is *no* such standpoint. There is no possibility of such a standpoint at all. If the word "standpoint" must be used here, one might say: It is the standpoint of *no* standpoint!

But, in the face of this declaration, Buddhism would forfeit all claims of teaching a final understanding to things if it does not declare what standpoint it adopts for the ultimate judgment of things. To which Buddhism replies by offering the only standpoint possible: It is the standpoint of *Cessation*, and nothing else whatever.

This Cessation, Extinguishing, Nibbana, and the way to its actualization—Buddhism and *only* Buddhism teaches.

Thus Buddhism adopts that one and only standpoint that remains beyond change, viz., the freeing from every standpoint, the cessation of all action. It is a standpoint beyond change not because it is some kind of basis that will ever remain fixed in existence, but because it is a coming to a halt of all actualities, *the giving up of all and sundry*. "Good things also must ye give up, monks. How much more the bad?" Whatever action that is conducive to and leads to Cessation, that Buddhism upholds. Whatever that does not so lead, that it discourages. Good, moral, right, praiseworthy—to Buddhism, is just that which leads to Nibbana, and nothing more.

Nibbana, the Buddha teaches, has two aspects.

With the attainment of Nibbana in its first aspect, all seeking comes to an end. He who achieves it, the Buddha teaches, realizes within himself and knows that he has come to the point when he can say to himself: Done is what was to be done; laid down the burden; there is nothing more to come herefrom. To be able to say this to oneself—that is to realize the goal of Nibbana. Thence onwards, he who has attained the goal lives not *by seeking*, but under, so to say, the remnant "heat" of *having sought*. All this will be explained in detail later.

But this is a point where Buddhism finds disfavour with the ordinary world. Here the world brings in charges of nihilism against the Buddha-word. For in the end, the cutting loose from every standpoint comes to a cutting loose from the *I*. What justification, the world asks, has Buddhism got for offering a way of life whereby it brings life to a stage only to cause an utter Cessation to it? If Buddhism claims to lead life to its highest consummation and at the same time claims that this consummation is only its complete extinguishing, does it then not mean that Buddhism gives to life everything noble and worthy only to take away everything, only to execute it in the end?

Indeed it does.

How dare then, does Buddhism do such a thing, when there is such a vast and unlimited stock of riches to enrich human life with? The life of mankind must be kept, seething, simmering, and glowing brighter and brighter fed by the inexhaustible stock of fuel there is in the world for it. The theologians would even venture that it would be an act of ingratitude!

This is not the place to deal with such charges brought in against the Doctrine. Here again one must first comprehend actuality before one is to try such charges in the court of actuality, and truly see their worth. I shall deal with them in the chapter on Nibbana. The reader will therefore have to be patient. Here I would make note of just two points. Firstly, that all this enriching of human thought and action which is so proudly spoken of is only an amassing in *quantity*. Not in *quality*. The quality still remains just as before. Only the quantity is larger; ever and again becoming larger. Essentially the same meat. Only the modes of preparation and the sauces in which it is served are different and diverse. Secondly, that if one is desirous of coming to the consummation of his search, then he must also be ready to accept the inevitable consequences that will follow. Life is a seeking; in every form it is a seeking. And when all this seeking is stilled, life is also stilled along with it. When what has to be done has been done, then nothing remains to be done. The difficulty is that men foster fanciful ideas of being able to exist for all time in a fully matured and fully enlightened state; to exist in some fashion or other for all time after having done all that has to be done; to exist in a sort of a stilled and static state. But actuality is anything but static. It is all a dynamic. He who wants to be continuously *doing* has all the opportunities in the world to do so. The Buddha teaches that all such a one has to do is to remain in the state of mind he is in already—Ignorant!

Three kinds of people there are in this world. Firstly, those who have an aversion to Nibbana. They are those self-seekers, whose Craving for pleasure and eternal existences is so strong that they either cannot understand or refuse to understand. To them life is something that has been gracefully given to them, and which they must therefore gratefully enjoy. Theirs is the easiest task. For all they have to do is to remain as they are—Ignorant. Secondly, those who want the world and Nibbana both! They are but casual hearers

who have half understood. Their heads take them one way, but their hearts take them in another. Theirs is an impossible task. And thirdly, those whose one aim is Nibbana. They have understood. Theirs is the hardest task.

The Buddha himself speaks of the untoward reaction that some people may have towards the Doctrine of Nibbana. "Might there be anxiety about internal non-being, Venerable Lord?" asked a certain monk of the Buddha. To which the Buddha replied, "There might be, monk. Here, monk, someone holds this view, 'The world is Self, and when I have departed I shall be permanent, enduring, eternal, not subject to change; and like this I shall remain for ever and

ever.' He listens to the Tathagata or his disciples teaching the Doctrine for the uprooting of all tendencies to views, assertions, obsessions, and adhesions; for the calming of all actualities; for the relinquishing of all foundations; for the destruction of all Craving; for the fading out; for Cessation; for extinction. It occurs to him, 'I shall surely be cut off; I shall surely perish; I shall surely be no more.' He sorrows, is distressed and laments, and beating his breast and bewailing, he falls into confusion. Thus indeed, monk, there is anxiety about non-being." (*Majjhima Nikaya* 22).

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THE BUDDHA AND KANT

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IT is with some reluctance that I venture to attempt a comparison between the Buddha and Kant because the two thinkers stand poles apart with regard to their fields of investigation. Further the system of the Buddha represents an original system of thought whose depth cannot be judged with mere reference to the cogency of reason, whilst the other has no pretension to such originality or depth. Nevertheless one cannot overlook the notable points of similarities between their approaches to the fundamental problems of morality. What is attempted in this short essay is therefore a brief survey of some of the ethical tenets of the two thinkers with due emphasis on those points over which they agree or differ.

It must be recalled at the outset that the two teachers lived in two countries that were separated by a distance of over five thousand miles. Chronologically the period that separated the two was greater, for the latter lived and passed away during the 6th century B.C. whilst the former was a thinker of the modern period. Despite these differences of time and space it is surprising that the problems which confronted them in the field of ethics were almost the same and consequently both arrived at the same conclusions even though through different methods.

The time in which Kant flourished was marked by a great gulf in philosophical thought between reason and experience or Rationalism and Empiricism. The earlier philosophers of the rationalist camp had shown that all knowledge was *a priori* analytical and necessary, by reason of the fact that the mind possesses initially ideas that are *innate*. To the empiricists however of the opposite camp represented by the English philosophers Locke, Berkeley and Hume knowledge was merely synthetic. It consisted merely of "putting together" of simple ideas which form the raw materials of sense experience. Since the mind possesses no innate ideas knowledge is therefore *a posteriori*. The problem of the times was then to find a *modus vivendi* between the claims of the rationalists and those of empiricists. Stated otherwise it con-

sisted of reconciling the *a posteriori* elements of mind—the actual data of our experience with the general principles that transform the raw materials of sense experience into knowledge.

Now a similar conflict in reason was created by the two dominant philosophical camps of dogmatism and scepticism during the Buddha's day. Whilst the dogmatists declared knowledge to be self-evident and *a priori* like the aforesaid rationalists the sceptics reduced all knowledge to mere sense experience undermining thereby the foundation of all morality and ethics. It was left for the Buddha to reconcile these divergent claims and thereby safeguard morality. Like Kant the Buddha ruled out reason as incapable of unravelling the deeper mysteries of reality and insisted on moral experience, which as opposed to reason transcends the antimonies of intellect and provides the only key to the understanding of "things as they are". In moral experience or intuition the conflict between science and religion is resolved once and for all; it serves as a higher synthesis of the empiricist and rationalist theories and plays an equally profound role in ethics as does the Hegelian conception of dialectics in speculative philosophy.

That Reality Transcends Intellect

The universe, Kant thinks can be divided into two realms: the "phenomenal" and the "Noumenal" which correspond to his psychological division of human nature into the phenomenal or the sentient self and the Noumenal self. The former under which may be grouped the senses and intellect is precluded from a direct knowledge of reality by reason of its projection of an *a priori* element into the raw materials of sense experience. The senses and intellect, in other words, give knowledge only of a world whose relations and connections have been projected by the knowing mind itself. But since reality is Noumenal the categories of senses and intellect will not apply to it. Reality must remain therefore unknowable to senses and intellect. In moral experience however, we are not said to be in contact

with a world of space and time into which we have projected the categories of our minds.

As a member of the phenomenal realm man is guided by his empirical or sentient self which is the repository of passions and desires of his lower nature. But when he acts as his moral self prescribes he is said to act in consonance with the *goodwill* which is uninfluenced by empirical frailties. Alternatively when man seeks gratification of desires and passions he is immoral and is subject to the casual laws operating in the phenomenal world but when he leads life of self-discipline as his goodwill prescribes, he transcends the limitations of the empirical and thereby establishes contact with reality.

Some Points of Similarity

What then is the nature of goodwill? "It is impossible" says Kant in defining the nature of goodwill "to conceive anything in the world or even out of it which can be taken as good without limitation save only a goodwill". This means that goodwill alone could be conceived as genuinely and absolutely good in itself, as distinguished from other good things in the world which are only means to promote further ends. For instance good things of the world such as intelligence, perseverance etc. are sought not for themselves but for the happiness or satisfaction they bring us. A goodwill on the other hand is an end in itself, because its goodness is not limited to goodness in this or that relation; it is in short good without limitation. It follows that moral obligation should express in the form of a "Duty" for its own sake implying thus the idea of "ought." Hence the term *Categorical Imperative* used by Kant with reference to this concept.

Now as a member of the phenomenal realm man is determined in much the same way as any particle of matter is in the realm of physics and chemistry. For when viewed from the standpoint of sciences of biology and psychology man constitutes an accumulation of traits and tendencies which may be characterised as the determining factor of his present consciousness. On the other hand the possession of a noumenal self in addition points to

the fact that he is also *free* since this self is the source of moral experience which depends on the ability to exercise free will. In moral life he is free to act as his moral sense prescribes irrespective of what he is as a phenomenal being. It is this same idea of a freewill operating in a mechanistic universe that is involved in the Buddhist teaching of *kamma* viewed in relation to *Paticca Samuppada* or Dependent Origination. The latter represents man as a partly determined being possessed of the freedom of choice between good and evil. The acceptance of freewill in man is thus a characteristic feature of both the thinkers.

In view of the transcendental nature of the concept of Duty, Kant attributes to this term a unique position. Man as an empirical being is tempted to act as his unruly desires and wishes dictate. Nevertheless the Categorical Imperative imparts to him that he ought to act otherwise. And what it prescribes are not hypothetical injunctions connected with the casual sequence of events but categorically binding truths that are universal. Its dictates consist of those actions that have not the least tinge of egoism in them. For this reason it is unique.

It will be interesting to compare the Categorical Imperative with the Buddhist concept of *Vipassana citta* (Introspective consciousness) which is above all that is worldly—*raga*, *dosa* and *moha*. Strictly speaking the Buddhist term conveys an analytically deeper ideal of morality which is presumably the result of strenuous efforts of meditation and mind control. But the Kantian conception of goodwill or Duty too involves a rigorous training of mind will be clear from the following passage quoted from one of his works:—

“Duty, thou great, thou exalted name wondrous thought that worketh neither by fond insinuation, flattery nor by threat but merely by holding up the naked law in the soul, and so controlling to thyself always reverence if not always obedience before whom all appetites are dumb however secretly they revel—whence thy original and where find are the root of thy anguish descent, thus loftily disclaiming all kindred appetite and want to be in like manner descended from which root in the changing condition of that worth which mankind alone import to themselves. Verily it can be nothing less than that what advances man as part of the physical system

about himself—connecting himself with an other things unapproached by sense into which the force of reason can alone pierce which supersensible has beneath it the phenomenal system wherewith man has only a fortuitous and contingent connection and so long with the whole of his adventitiously determinable existence in space and time.”

The passage needs no elucidation. It enjoins an exceedingly lofty ideal of ethics based on *pure reason* to the neglect of metaphysics. The ethical value of our judgements are intuitively sensed by us irrespective of whatever standards set up by religions. The postulation of a theological principle creates only an *impasse* rendering moral life impracticable though of course Kant was not reluctant to accept the idea of those as a mere possibility which he believed justifies the moral order. But a number of maxims were formulated by him as a substitute which unfortunately are inadequate unlike the truths propounded in Buddhist code. Both agreed that ceremonial religion is an obstacle to progress and that the ethical ideal must be realised by following a rational course of conduct.

The highest ethical action according to Kant is that which is unaccompanied by any feeling whatsoever of our hearts whether good or bad. If I were moved at the sight of a beggar and offer him a coin or perform a similar action connected with the so-called good qualities—it would be truly speaking an egoistic action performed though unconsciously, to satisfy my uneasiness of mind, and *ipso facto* unjustified from the highest ethical point of view. The promptings of the Categorical Imperative on the contrary are expressed in the form of “Duty” for its own sake irrespective of subjective feelings.

Under this category may be grouped the action (*kriya citta*) of the saints or *arahats* who are said to be above all good and evil. Having destroyed all the fetters of empiric life the *arahat* is not guided by craving or Will-to-live (*Tanha*). Hence his actions are described as non-ethical; they are neither actuated by motives nor productive of effects.

The Existence of Evil

The existence of evil or suffering in the world is a universally admitted fact whatever significance is assigned to the term by the different creeds

and ethical systems. Evil is defined by most theistic religions as a perversion of the good, a negative element in the world. The reader is perhaps aware of the Christian conception of evil as a force introduced but the Devil into the world with the Fall of man. It is said that after the act of Creation the Devil rebelled against Him and succeeded somehow or other in perpetuating misery. Whether it was part of His plan to have so happened or not the fact of evil contradicts the idea of a benevolent Deity.

According to Buddhism the universe is neither a by-product of matter nor the result of an act of creation. In the former case which is the view maintained by Scientific materialism the universe cannot be a moral one, since morality cannot be explained in terms of material conditions. If the very mechanism of the universe is purely materialistic then human beings too must follow a pattern of behaviour not different from that of matter in physics. Even the thought processes cannot be explained without reference to cerebral activity of the brain. Thus the pre-eminence of matter rules out freedom of will and with it goes overboard all ethical principles and values. The theological interpretation on the other hand identifies whatever vital force in human beings with the macrocosmic Soul of a God and thus seeks to establish the reality of moral life on supernatural foundation. Buddhism resolves this incompatibility between science and religion by postulation of the principle of *kamma* which serves as the surest foundation for morality in the highest sense.

The Pali term *kamma* means action which also implies reaction for every volitional action (*sankhara*) actuated by craving must produce a corresponding result (*vipaka*) good or bad as the case may be. Just as in the physical world like begets like so in the moral sphere of men *kamma* works impartially. The miserable that encounter nothing but sorrow and suffering all through life as well as the more fortunate endowed with better conditions and happiness are only reaping the harvest of what they have sown in the past. But neither are victims of an irrecoverable fate. For by virtue of the possession of a freewill they become masters of their destiny, too.

Beings are thus the visible effects of their own immaterial force of

kamma even as the objects of our sense are effects of causes purely material. And as long as this kammic force lasts man must wander through endless sansara falling a prey to its ills and miseries.

Kamma is not an agent that inflicts punishment or rewards men for their respective behaviour any more than the law of gravity causes a man to fall from a high tower. But man has to struggle against this law and free himself from its clutches, by transcending it. This is the *summum bonum* of moral life. This ideal is to be realised through renunciation, through the dispelling of the ego by efforts of mind control. The Four Noble Truths in this respect (which is a rational diagnosis of evil and a remedy leading to its cure) is the supreme guide in life "the law above gods and men from everlasting to everlasting."

Kantian Maxims

The Categorical Imperative as we saw earlier prescribes to man what his duty is. In other words it prescribes that he should always act according to certain general principles or maxims which are of universal appeal. They are of such nature as everybody would acknowledge their universality irrespective personal whims and desires. Nor are they self contradictory. For example that we should not tell lies is a universally recognised principle. If all were to tell lies nobody would

believe others and lying would be profitless. Thus wrong conduct is self-contradictory as it cannot be universalised. Hence Kant's first maxim "Act only according to maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law."

Another important maxim runs thus: "So act as to use humanity both in your own person and in the person of every other as an end never simply as a means." What is enjoined by this maxim is none other than the ethical aspect of the teaching of *anatta* of the Buddhist code. Man's primary duty involves respect for others instead of the unfair and arbitrary satisfaction of the personal self. Since the term humanity implies the essential characteristic of possessing reason each is bound to treat the other as an end never simply as a means.

Kant gives a number of other maxims, too, but they need not be stressed here as the above two are presumably the most important of them and convey the general character of his ethical propositions. These maxims are undoubtedly excellent as ethical propositions but in actual life they afford us little practical guidance, particularly in the decision of moral issues entailing alternative courses of action. This is not so with the Buddhist code which enables us to evaluate and justify moral judgments in the light of absolute principles leaving thus no room for exceptions to occur.

Both the systems of Kant and the Buddha may be characterised as subjective in the sense that moral judgments are intuited. But they should not be confounded with the subjectivist theories of thinkers who regard intuition as an inherited instinct. According to these our feeling of moral obligation has its roots in social expediency or utility, that is to say in those kinds of behaviour which our ancestors approved or condemned for non-ethical reasons. For instance, behaviour connected with the ideas of justice, courage, unselfishness were encouraged by them because these proved useful to the tribe for its survival and it is these utilitarian reasons, they say, that have been transmitted to, and expressed in, modern man's moral intuitions of the conception of duty for duty's sake.

Since the purpose of this short essay is to reveal some of the common features of Buddhist and Kantian ethics, I do not propose to discuss the deeper implications involved in them. Nor do I think it relevant here to examine them in the light of modern ethical theories.

From the above considerations, however, it will be clear to the reader that Kant as a moralist is nearer the Buddha than most other thinkers of the West. His conception of ethics strikes a note that is essentially Buddhistic and may even be characterised as, in spite of whatever divergences, the Western counterpart of Buddhist ethics.

All members are kindly requested to donate at least one year's membership fee to the Fort Branch Building Fund, and enrol a new member each month.

For particulars please write

**Hony. General Secretary,
Y. M. B. A.,
Colombo.**

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

WE are happy to announce the receipt of a very generous donation of Rs. 14,220/- from the Asia Foundation towards improvements to our Library.

Y.M.B.A. FORT VIHARE

In view of the emergency the formal opening of the New Vihare in the Colombo Fort was postponed. It is now open for worship as from 14th July, 1958.

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OBITUARY

We record with regret the deaths of Mr. B. W. William (Life Member) and Mr. W. G. W. Ranaweera.

KOREAN TRIPITAKA

THE Buddhist Dong-Kook University of Korea has undertaken the work of publishing the Korean Tripitaka which

has been preserved in Hae in Sa Temple since 1399 A.D. The particular set of Buddhist scriptures has been catalogued in the country under Vinaya, Sutra and Sastra. The original texts have been cut over eighty-two thousand blocks of wood and therefore are familiarly known as Eighty Thousand Tai Chang. They were carefully stored in two spacious halls of the temple.

Tripitaka Koreana, as it is now called by scholars, was originally published in the first half of the eleventh century by Bhikshu Sao Ki and several collaborators in the reign of King Hyun Chong and took sixteen years to complete. Destroyed two centuries later in the course of a Mongolian invasion, the second publication appeared five years afterwards in the face of the enemy. It was also a prayer-offering the liberation of the country. At least three recensions were used in fixing the final form which is known as the Koryu Edition. The sponsors of Tripitaka Koreana claim that it is the oldest and the best of all the Chinese translations now extant of the Tripitaka.

The proposed publication is under the supervision of Dr. Sung Wook Pack, President of Dong-kook University. The reproduction will be by the offset method.

BUDDHIST EXHIBITION IN ROME

INFORMATION has been received from Professor Giuseppe Tucci that an Exhibition of Gandharan and Central Asian art was recently held in Rome. IsMeo, the Central and Far Eastern Italian Institute, of which Dr. Tucci is the president, sponsored the Exhibition. Some unique exhibits from the Museums of Lahore and Peshawar were the most admired of the several objects on display. They were described as wonderful and were greatly appreciated by the large number of enthusiastic visitors. A Catalogue of permanent value for documentation was issued in connection with the Exhibition.

It will be recalled that Dr. Tucci is a noted Tibetan traveller and scholar of Northern Buddhism on which he has written with authority. Last year he was engaged in excavating ancient Buddhist sites in Swat Valley in collaboration with the Pakistan Government. When on a brief visit to Ceylon in November he met a number of Ceylon scholars both in Colombo and Peradeniya.

WESAK IN PARIS (2502/1958)

AS in former years, Wesak was celebrated two days running.

On Saturday the 3rd of May, the cultural celebration was held in the beautiful lecture hall of the Musee Guimet, with His Excellency General Chai Prathipasen, Ambassador of Thailand in Paris, very kindly presiding as in the last few years.

On the platform there was a beautiful stone statue, a masterpiece of Khmer art (graciously loaned by the Museum's directors, Mr. Philippe Stern and Mademoiselle J. Auboyer for the occasion), which was surrounded by great bunches of tulips and white lilac. Beside the statue, as in the days of the Lord Buddha, were two eminent members of the Sangha living in Paris, Venerable Bra Gru Sanghasattha Phonn Sompheach Dhammarama, newly arrived from Cambodia and who was meeting a French public for the first time, and Venerable Dr. W. Rahula who has been with us for seven years, helping us with our winter lectures and with our celebrations at Wesak.

His Excellency the Ambassador of Thailand, Mr. P. R. Gunasekera, Minister of Ceylon who has just taken up his post in Paris, Mr. Poc Thieunn, charge d'Affaires for Cambodia, and Mr. Jean Filliozat, Professor at the College de France, occupied the right of the platform.

After words of welcome expressed by Venerable Dr. Rahula to Ven. Phonn Sompheach Dhammarama and to Mr. P. R. Gunasekera, Minister of Ceylon, speeches were given by Venerable Bra Gru Sanghasattha Phonn Sompheach Dhammarama, H. E. the Ambassador of Thailand, the Minister of Ceylon and Professor Jean Filliozat. Then several of our members read passages from the Suttas on the Birth, Illumination and Parinibbana of Buddha.

Our President, G. Constant Lounsbery, then tendered the thanks of Les Amis du Bouddhisme to all those who had helped to realize the beautiful Festival of Wesak.

On Sunday, May 4th, at 9 p.m. our Shrine Room was open to all those wishing to offer homage of their Meditations to the Prince of Peace.


At 5 p.m. Venerable Bra Gru Sanghasattha Phonn Sompeach Dhammarama made the flower offering and gave the Precepts, followed by the reciting of Paritta.

At 8.30 p.m. Venerable Dr. Rahula came to close the day by another offering of flowers, giving again the Precepts and turning our thoughts to Metta.

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